Items relating to the IAEA, the UN
 

 

Security Council, and the enrichment


 

of uranium by the Republic of Iran

 

 

 

[From Joe Gerson's letter of March 8, 2006, supporting

 

ElBaradei's call for diplomacy with Iran, to May 28, 2008]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                 Contents

 

 

 


1.  Letter from Joe Gerson to gain support for ElBaradei's call for diplomacy with Iran on

     the nuclear enrichment issue

 

2.  Remarks by ElBaradei at conclusion of March 2006 IAEA Board of Governors meeting

 

3.  IAEA praises Iran for "a significant step forward" in explaining past atomic actions that

     have raised suspicions (Associated Press article of August 30, 2007)

 

4.  "ElBaradei: An Indispensable Irritant to Iran and Its Foes," article from the New York

     Times, September 17, 2007

 

5.   IAEA Board of Governors November 16, 2007 Report to the UN Security Council,

      "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
      Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran
"

 

6.  "The Politics of Reporting on IAEA Reports," Farideh Farhi, Informed Comment: Public

     Affairs, November 16, 2007

 

7.  IAEA Board of Governors February 22, 2008 Report to the UN Security Council,

    "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions

    of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic

    Republic of Iran"

 

8.  United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803 adopted March 3, 2008

 

9.  Informational Bulletin distributed by the UN's Department of Information

      Regarding Security Council Resolution 1803 Adopted March 3, 2008

      (Includes information not found in the resolution itself)

 

10.  "Tehran to IAEA: Iran will one day seek reparations," Tehran Times, March 5,

        2008 (This item includes the FULL TEXT of the March 5, 2008 speech by Ali Asghar

        Soltanieh, the Republic of Iran's permanent representative to the IAEA, and is very

        informative, expressing Iran's point of view on the matter of the UN's involvement with

        Iran on the nuclear enrichment issue.  Iran's point of view as expressed here is almost

        never seen in the western press.)

 

11.  Iran Safeguards Report Sent to UN Security Council, IAEA Board (This simple

       announcement made by the UN should be compared with the next three items which

       contain propaganda.  In the past, the pattern has been for the U.S. to rush to say that

       a new IAEA report was very condemning of Iran's activities.  Then, when the report was

       made public, it would not be as condemning as the U.S. had led people to think.)

 

12.  "IAEA: Iran may be withholding info in nuke probe," George Jahn, Associate Press article,

       May 26, 2008

 

13. "IAEA: Iran defies demands on nuclear drive," Simon Morgan, AFP, May 26, 2008

 

14.  "Atomic Monitor Signals Concern Over Iran’s Work," Elaine Sciolino, New York Times,

       May 27, 2008

 

15.  Information on the current makeup of the IAEA Board of Governors

 

16.  "Soltanieh: Alleged studies not on IAEA agenda," IRNA article published in the Tehran

       Times on May 28, 2008  (This article shows how the old U.S. trick of submitting late

       questions to the IAEA without timely presentation of supporting data has resulted in the

       studies allegedly conducted by Iran not being on the IAEA’s agenda.)

 

17.  IAEA Board of Governors May 26, 2008 Report to the UN Security Council,
       "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security

       Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran"

          (This is the restricted report of ElBaradei which will be discussed at the June meeting of the Board of
          Governors and will then become the Board's report.)

 

18.  "NY Times again misrepresents IAEA report on Iran," Cyrus Safdari, Iran Affairs,

      May 27, 2008

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Background: Mohamed ElBaradei on Iran Nuclear Diplomacy

 

From: Joe Gerson

Date: March 8, 2006

Friends,

With the radio blaring the U.S. line about, in John Bolton’s words the painful consequences” Iran faces if it does not move to meet the expectations of the IAEA, I thought it might be helpful to share Mohamed ElBaradei’s statement after the failure of the IAEA Board of Directors to reach agreement with Iran this week. You will note that while urging greater Iranian “transparency” and stating his belief that “there is no other option but negotiations”, he has urged continuing diplomacy “to help Iran to get themselves out of the hole they have dug themselves into.”

Let’s challenge the militarist rhetoric and support ElBaradei’s call for diplomacy, diplomacy, diplomacy.

Also, for those who want to go deeper into this issue, please take a look at the March 6 edition of The New Yorker. There’s very helpful and thorough article – “Exiles” by Connie Bruck - on the political background and dynamics to the Bush administration’s campaign for “regime change.”

For Peace,

Joseph Gerson

American Friends Service Committee

 

 

 

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Remarks by IAEA Director General ElBaradei at conclusion
of March 2006 meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors


(ROUGH TRANSCRIPT)

The Board has completed its consideration of the Iran issue. I can say that there are common threats. First that Iran needs to be continuing to work with the agency, and to go the extra mile. No one would be more happy than me to conclude all the outstanding issues. Second that Iran needs to continue to work on confidence building measures. This resolution of outstanding issues. ..The international community for a while has asked Iran to take confidence building measures. Third, everyone is looking for a political settlement. Everyone understands that a comprehensive political settlement taking into account all underlying issues is needed.

We need cool headed approaches. We need people to lower the rhetoric, to see how we can move forward.

This will take some time, this will not be resolved tomorrow, it is complex and we need to put our heads together. Everyone benefits from this.

 

I will convey my report, as requested, to the Security Council today or tomorrow. Whether or when the Security Council takes up this issue is obviously for the Security Council to decide. What action they take is obviously for the Security Council to deliberate on.

I should again say, everyone who spoke on the Security Council emphasized this as another phase in diplomacy, and as an extension of the solution. The Security Council's prime responsibility is the peaceful settlement of disputes. To lend its weight so that Iran works with us, takes confidence building measures, and to use the Security council as a forum to find ways and means.

As I said earlier, there are few options and one solution: A comprehensive political security and economic agreement that underlies the nuclear programme of Iran. No one questions the right of Iran to nuclear energy, but the international community needs to be assured it is for exclusively peaceful purposes.

We will continue to work on our mandate. We have teams slotted to go soon to Iran. I continue to ask Iran to be transparency. It is in Iran's interests to clarify outstanding issues. It will impact positively on cooperation. It will impact positively on confidence building measures.

As with North Korea in the past, maybe for the next few months or weeks, there will be a division of labour, we will continue to do verification, and the Security Council will deliberate on the global political picture, to get Iran to cooperate and to go back to the negotiating table. The solution should engage all parties.

Once we start to discuss and see the issues, the US should be engaged in dialogue. That is far down the road. I look for the Security Council to provide support to move down the diplomatic road.

Q&A

I am not disappointed. Things could have twisted and turned, but I continue to hope to achieve an agreement, to go back to the negotiating table, it could happen next week, we have time. Hopefully the Security Council can lend a hand.

My role is to make sure Iran cooperates, and to strike a balance between Iran's right to nuclear energy and the concerns. There are so many ways to skin a cat. Hope all will go out of his or her way for a political settlement; it is the only way forward.

It is normal that we will keep the Security Council informed. What exactly is the nature of the report. The resolution said I should convey the discussion and the report to the Security Council. Let’s not get into the legalities.


 

I am still optimistic. when I said within weeks, the point is sooner or later the parties will decide there is no other option but negotiations. Iran will take the necessary confidence-building measures. How and under which modalities which parties are questions that I guess will be discussed in the Security Council.

I hope we will not have escalation. I hope we will not have escalation. I am worried and Kofi Annan also mentioned this morning the need to be cooler headed, to lower the pitch of rhetoric.  A war of words will not help. Its now time to get back to the negotiating table.

It is a misunderstanding to see a discussion in the Security Council as a failure of the IAEA. The Security Council is a part of the non-proliferation regime. It is part of the safeguards agreements and statute. We need to engage in political dialogue. We need to help Iran to get themselves out of the hole they have dug themselves into.

--

Felicity Hill

Political Adviser on Nuclear and Disarmament Issues

direct line: + 31 20 718 2164 mobile phone: + 31 64616 2018

Greenpeace International

Ottho Heldringstraat 5 1066 AZ

Amsterdam

The Netherlands

T: + 31 207182000 F: + 31 205148158

 

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IAEA: Iranian cooperation significant
 

By George Jahn, Associated Press Writer

August 30, 2007


The U.N. nuclear agency said Thursday that Iran was producing less nuclear fuel than expected and praised Tehran for "a significant step forward" in explaining past atomic actions that have raised suspicions.

The report is expected to make it more difficult for the United States to rally support for a new round of sanctions against Tehran.

At the same time, the report confirmed that Iran continued to expand its uranium enrichment program, reflecting the Islamic republic's defiance of the U.N. Security Council. Still, U.N. officials said, both enrichment and the building of a plutonium-producing reactor was continuing more slowly than expected.

International Atomic Energy Agency Deputy Director General Olli Heinonen, who brokered the cooperation deal with Iran, highlighted the importance of the agreement, noting that Tehran's past refusal to answer the IAEA's questions triggered Security Council sanctions in the first place.

But he cautioned that Iran still needed to fully implement its commitments, telling reporters that "the key is that Iran ... provides the information that we need" in a time frame that results in clarity about Iran's past suspicious activities by year's end.

There was no immediate U.S. comment. But France, a close U.S. ally on Iran, said cooperation by Tehran was not enough to eliminate the threat of new U.N. penalties.

"As long as there is not a clear ... decision from Iran about the suspension of activities linked to enrichment, we will pursue ... looking into a third sanctions resolution," French Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Pascale Andreani said in Paris.

Drawn up by IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei, much of the confidential report obtained by The Associated Press focused on the already publicized action plan finalized just a few weeks ago between the agency and Iran, restating progress in some areas and time frames for Iran to respond to additional questions.

In that plan, Iran agreed to come up to answer the final questions from agency experts by November.
 

If that and all other deadlines are met and Iran provides all the information sought, the agency should be able to close the file on its more than four-year investigation of Tehran's nuclear activities by year's end, a senior U.N. official said.

He and other U.N. officials — all speaking on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to comment to media — declined to comment, however, on whether a clean bill that banishes suspicions about Iran's former nuclear programs and experiments would be enough to derail the threat of new U.N. sanctions.

The United States and its closest allies said more were needed because of Tehran's defiance of council demands that it mothball its uranium enrichment program and stop building a plutonium-producing reactor. Both can create the product that can serve as the fissile component of nuclear warheads.

Like the joint plan on cooperation between Iran and the agency, the report — to be considered at a meeting by the 35-nation IAEA board starting Sept. 10 — said the agency felt that information provided by Iran on past small-scale plutonium experiments had "resolved" agency concerns about the issue.

In Tehran, the official Islamic Republic News Agency cited senior nuclear official Mohammad Saeedi as saying that conclusion "ended all the baseless U.S. accusations against Iran over reprocessing plutonium."

The agency report also noted cooperation on other issues, while specifying that Tehran still needed to satisfy the agency's curiosity about its enrichment technology and traces of highly enriched uranium at a facility linked to the military.

The report also said Iran agreed to study documentation from the agency on the "Green Salt Project" — a plan that the U.S. alleges links diverse components of a nuclear weapons program including uranium enrichment, high explosives testing and a missile re-entry vehicle.

Diplomats told the AP last year that the agency was made aware of the alleged program by U.S. intelligence. One of the U.N. officials suggested the IAEA might share its confidential documents — possibly including secret U.S. information — with Iran in its investigation of the "Green Salt Project," but declined to offer details.

As expected, the report also confirmed that, while Iran continued to expand its uranium enrichment program, it was doing so much more slowly than expected, and had produced only negligible amounts of nuclear fuel that was far below the level usable for nuclear warheads.

One of the U.N. officials also noted that construction of the plutonium-producing reactor at the city of Arak had slowed in recent months.

He said that "design difficulties, getting equipment, materials and components, and fuel technology, plus perhaps some political considerations," could be causing the delay.

The allusion to "political considerations" appeared linked to reports that Iranian officials might be considering stopping construction of the Arak reactor in another sign of good will calculated to blunt the threat of new U.N. sanctions.

Citing unidentified Iranian sources, Jane's Defense Weekly earlier this week said some members of Iran's Supreme National Security Council were pushing for such a move.

That — along with the months-long slowdown in enrichment activity, plus significant Iranian readiness to cooperate with the IAEA investigation — could combine to stymie the U.S.-led push for new U.N. penalties, diplomats said.

 

 

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ElBaradei: An Indispensable
Irritant to Iran and Its Foes

 

New York Times

September 17, 2007

 



VIENNA — Late in August, Mohamed ElBaradei put the finishing touches on a
nuclear accord negotiated in secret with Iran.

The deal would be divisive and risky, one of the biggest gambles of his 10 years as director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Iran would answer questions about its clandestine nuclear past in exchange for a series of concessions. With no advance notice or media strategy, Dr. ElBaradei ordered the plan released in the evening. And then he waited.

The next day, diplomats from the United States, France, Britain and Germany marched into his office atop a Vienna skyscraper to deliver a joint protest. The deal, they said, amounted to irresponsible meddling that threatened to undermine a United Nations Security Council strategy to punish, not reward, Tehran.

Dr. ElBaradei, an Egyptian-born lawyer, was polite but firm. “If Iran wants to answer questions, what am I supposed to do, tell them it can’t?” he asked.

Then, brandishing one of his characteristic mangled metaphors, he dismissed his critics as “living room coaches who shoot from the hip.”

Almost five years after he stood up to the Bush administration on Iraq and then won the Nobel Peace Prize for his trouble, Dr. ElBaradei now finds himself at the center of the West’s turbulent confrontation with Iran, derided yet relied upon by all sides.

To his critics in the West, he is guilty of serious diplomatic sins — bias toward Iran, recklessness and, above all, a naïve grandiosity that leads him to reach far beyond his station. Over the past year, even before he unveiled his deal with Tehran, Western governments had presented him with a flurry of formal protests over his stewardship of the Iran case.

Even some of his own staff members have become restive, questioning his leadership and what they see as his sympathy for the Iranians, according to diplomats here.
 

Yet the Iranians also seek to humiliate him and block his inspectors.

“He is the man in the middle,” said Lee H. Hamilton, a former Democratic congressman long respected for his foreign affairs acumen. “The United States and Iran simply do not believe one another. There is deep distrust.” And, he added, that makes the situation “very difficult” for any go-between.

Even so, while Dr. ElBaradei’s harshest detractors describe him as drunk with the power of his Nobel, what keeps him on center stage is a pragmatic truth: He is everyone’s best hope.

He has grown ever more indispensable as American credibility on atomic intelligence has nose-dived and European diplomacy with Tehran has stalled.

For the world powers, he is far and away the best source of knowledge about Iran’s nuclear progress — information Washington uses regularly to portray Tehran as an imminent global danger.

Even the Iranians need him (as he likes to remind them) because his maneuvers promise to lessen and perhaps end the sting of United Nations  sanctions.

Dr. ElBaradei, who is 65, seems unfazed, even energized, by all the dissent. He alludes to a sense of destiny that has pressed him into the role of world peacemaker. He has called those who advocate war against Iran “crazies,” and in two long recent interviews described himself as a “secular pope” whose mission is to “make sure, frankly, that we do not end up killing each other.”

He added, “You meet someone in the street — and I do a lot — and someone will tell me, ‘You are doing God’s work,’ and that will keep me going for quite a while.”

It is precisely that self-invented role that enrages his detractors. They say he has stepped dangerously beyond the mandate of the I.A.E.A., a United Nations agency best known for inspecting atomic installations in an effort to find and deter secret work on nuclear arms.

“Instead of being the head of a technical agency, whose job is to monitor these agreements, and come up with objective assessments, he has become a world policy maker, an advocate,” said Robert J. Einhorn, the State Department’s nonproliferation director from 1999 to 2001.

In particular, Dr. ElBaradei is faulted for his new deal with Iran, which has defied repeated Security Council demands to suspend its enrichment of uranium. Critics say the plan threatens to buy Iran more time to master that technology, which can make fuel for reactors or atomic bombs.

Despite Iran’s long history of nuclear deception, Dr. ElBaradei’s supporters cite his vindication on Iraq — no evidence of an active Iraqi nuclear program has been found — as reason to listen to him now.

“He could have saved us a disastrous war if we had paid attention to him,” said Thomas M. Franck, an international law professor emeritus at New York  University Law School, who taught Dr. ElBaradei there decades ago and has remained a close friend.
 

After the Iran accord became public, The Washington Post published an editorial branding Dr. ElBaradei a “Rogue Regulator.” His wife, Aida, who is his closest political adviser, came up with a response — T-shirts that succinctly frame the ElBaradei debate: “Rogue regulator” will be stenciled on the front, “Or smooth operator?” on the back.

Ambitious, but Reserved

When Dr. ElBaradei received the Nobel Prize in December 2005, he used his acceptance speech to lay out an ambitious agenda — helping the poor, saving the environment, fighting crime and confronting new dangers spawned by globalization.

“We cannot respond to these threats by building more walls, developing bigger weapons, or dispatching more troops,” he said. “Quite to the contrary, by their very nature, these security threats require primarily international cooperation.”

Yet Dr. ElBaradei’s expansive view of himself is a striking counterpoint to his personal style.

That Nobel night, he was celebrating with friends in his suite at the Grand Hotel in Oslo when thousands of people appeared on the street below, holding candles and cheering. Unsure of himself, he froze.

“He was clearly nonplused and adrift at what to do,” Mr. Franck recalled. “His wife told him to wave back.”
 

A tall, shy man with a salt-and-pepper mustache, Dr. ElBaradei is so averse to small talk that he refuses even superficial conversation with staff members in the agency’s elevators, aides say.

Rather than venture into the dining room or cafeteria, he brings lunch from home and eats at his desk. He must be arm-twisted to make even the briefest appearance at important agency functions.

“He is very reserved, very aloof,” Mrs. ElBaradei said recently over tea in their apartment, filled with rugs from Iran and the awards and other baubles that come with her husband’s persona as a campaigner for world peace. “He thinks these diplomatic receptions and dinners are a waste of time.”

He shares confidences with only a handful of associates. “He doesn’t have meetings where he seeks input,” said one former agency official, who like some others would speak about Dr. ElBaradei only on the condition of anonymity. “It’s, ‘Here’s what I want to do.’”

He has become a compulsive name-dropper, diplomats say. “He remains a shy man, but one who is somehow dazzled by his own destiny,” said one European nonproliferation official who knows him well. “He’s always saying, ‘Oh, I talked to Condi last week and she told me this,’ or ‘I was with Putin and he said this or that.’ He’s almost like a child.”

The eldest of five children from an upper-middle-class family in Cairo, Dr. ElBaradei grew up with a French nanny and a private school education. At 19, he became the national youth champion in squash. “You have to be cunning,” he said of the sport.

His father, a lawyer, was the head of Egypt’s bar association. The son studied law and joined the foreign service, eventually serving in New York. Living there in the late 1960s and early ’70s was so transforming, he said, that today he feels greater kinship with New York than Cairo, more comfortable speaking English than Arabic.

While working on his doctorate on international law at New York University, he went to New York Knicks basketball games and to the Metropolitan Opera, and stayed up late talking American politics and drinking wine in Greenwich Village bars. His first girlfriend, he said, was Jewish.

Moving up the diplomatic ladder, he eventually settled in Vienna, where he became the nuclear agency’s legal counselor and then head of external relations. His ascent to the top job, in 1997, was a surprise.

After none of the proposed candidates received the needed votes, the American ambassador to the agency at the time, John Ritch, led a quiet campaign for Dr. ElBaradei, a close friend. In a cable to Washington, Mr. Ritch recalled, he said the United States could do no better than backing “an Egyptian who is a passionate Knicks fan.”

Dr. ElBaradei started out with the modest goal of reorganizing the agency, which today has about 2,300 employees. Then came Iraq. Before the war, the Bush administration repeatedly warned of Saddam Hussein getting the bomb, and called on atomic inspectors to confirm that view.

Instead, in March 2003, Dr. ElBaradei told the Security Council that after hundreds of inspections over three months, his teams had found “no evidence or plausible indication of the revival of a nuclear weapons program.” And while President Bush charged that Iraq was trying to buy uranium in Africa, Dr. ElBaradei dismissed the underlying intelligence as “not authentic.”

The invasion, 13 days later, was “the saddest day of my life,” he said.

Even as American troops found no unconventional arms, the Bush administration waged a quiet campaign against Dr. ElBaradei and his agency, barring his inspectors from Iraq and working behind the scenes to keep him from a third term.

He said he had been “99 percent decided” against running until he learned that John R. Bolton, then Washington’s United Nations

ambassador, was determined to block him.

Dr. ElBaradei recalled “a sense of revulsion” that such a personal decision should be made “by anybody else.” His wife said she had told him, “Mohamed, you run — tomorrow!”

Ultimately, with no candidate of its own and no international support, the United States backed down.

In October 2005, a month into his new term, the Nobel call came.

Breaking the Seals


The standoff with Tehran entered its current phase on Jan. 10, 2006, when Iran
broke the I.A.E.A.’s protective seals on equipment at its underground site at Natanz and resumed efforts to enrich uranium.

When the West began imposing sanctions, Iran retaliated by cutting back on its cooperation with Dr. ElBaradei’s agency and barring dozens of its inspectors. As the Iranians ramped up enrichment, the agency and the rest of the world were steadily going blind to aspects of Iran’s nuclear program.

Dr. ElBaradei himself was humiliated on a rare visit to Tehran in April 2006. Two days before his arrival, the Iranians announced a breakthrough — industrial-level enrichment.

Still, Dr. ElBaradei hoped to meet the supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Instead, he spent much of his time cooling his heels in a hotel room.

Critics say Dr. ElBaradei has responded to such provocations by going soft on Tehran — glossing over its violations, caving to its demands and writing reports that bend over backward to be conciliatory.

For instance, they say he has added to inspection woes by moving a half-dozen top investigators off the case, which the agency defends as normal rotations. The agency’s chief Iran inspector, Christian Charlier, who spoke out publicly about Iran’s evasiveness, was assigned to the agency’s Brazil file.

“He’s naïve and idiosyncratic and that amounts to being dangerous,” Mr. Bolton said. “His argument for years was that he could talk Iran out of being a nuclear threat. Then it was, ‘O.K., we’ll just let

them experiment.’ Now it’s, ‘You’re never going to get them to give up.’”

But Dr. ElBaradei’s supporters say he is engaged in a balancing act that deals as much with Washington’s excesses as with Tehran’s.

 

In May, after Vice President Dick Cheney warned from an aircraft carrier off Iran’s coast that the United States was ready to use its naval power to keep Iran from “gaining nuclear weapons and dominating this region,” Dr. ElBaradei offered a quick response: he declared that Iran had achieved “the knowledge” of enrichment — implying that it was too late for military action or other Western punishment for refusing to stop its atomic efforts.

“The fact of the matter,” he said, “is that one of the purposes of suspension — keeping them from getting the knowledge — has been overtaken by events.”

His remarks outstripped the analyses of his own inspectors, who were reporting technical problems at Natanz, and contributed to suspicions that he was exaggerating Iran’s progress as a political maneuver. Even so, that argument — that Iran has already crossed an important line — is the tacit assumption behind the new accord.

The plan, released Aug. 27, sets a firm timetable for Iran to clear up a half-dozen controversies about past secret activities, while also improving access for I.A.E.A. inspectors.

The diplomats who marched into Dr. ElBaradei’s office the next day shredded the plan point by point.

They expressed dismay that the accord, negotiated with no diplomatic input, omitted any stipulation that Iran suspend enrichment. One envoy noted that the plan forces inspectors to ask questions on only one issue at a time, leaving the most delicate topics until the end.



There was general alarm that the document suggested treating Iran like a “routine” case,
instead of a country that had lied repeatedly, and, according to some governments, harbors a secret nuclear-arms program.

Dr. ElBaradei’s response, paraphrased by a Western official, was that “all you are doing is being suspicious; the agency cannot judge Iranian intentions.”

In the days that followed, representatives of other countries hammered Dr. ElBaradei with sharp criticism. But a week later, many governments had begun to believe that their strategy was backfiring. They decided to try to co-opt Dr. ElBaradei rather than isolate him.

The new thinking went like this: he and the Iranians had won this round. Much of the world would consider the agreement on a timetable a step forward. By contrast, Western diplomacy was hopelessly stalled.

On Sept. 7, envoys from the four Western powers again visited Dr. ElBaradei’s office. This time, though, they offered support for his effort to clear up the past, and said they welcomed his renewed support in pressing Iran to suspend enrichment and let inspectors conduct wider inquiries.

“We told the Americans it would do no good to criticize ElBaradei, that it would only make him look even more like a hero,” said one senior European official.

In the interview, Dr. ElBaradei called the shift “a complete change” — a result of his explaining and “standing firm.” He called his accord a sound step toward defusing the Iran confrontation.
 

“I have no qualm that some people have distrust because of Iran’s past behavior,” he said.

But sanctions alone, he added, would solve nothing. “You need to sit together and talk about it and try to work out mechanisms to build confidence.”

And if the Iranians do not keep their promises, he said: “I told them very openly that it will backfire. Absolutely.”

Weighing the Risks

Early in September, when the agency’s board gathered here in Vienna and discussed the new plan, the American envoy, Gregory L. Schulte, stunned colleagues by praising Dr. ElBaradei. He told the board that the deal was “a potentially important development and a step in the right direction.”

Even so, diplomats and visitors say that in unguarded moments, Dr. ElBaradei has expressed the conviction that a lasting accommodation with Iran must wait until the Bush administration is gone.
 

Even if Iran begins to deliver on its latest promises, Dr. ElBaradei faces a potential deal breaker. As part of the accord, he is demanding that the United States give Tehran copies of American intelligence documents related to suspected secret Iranian military work on nuclear warheads. As a lawyer, he said, he was determined to give Iran the access it deserved.

And if it turns out that Iran did, in the past, make secret moves toward nuclear arms? “Many countries had ambitions in the past,” Dr. ElBaradei said, raising the prospect that, in theory, Iran, too, might “have to make certain confessions.”

He added that the most important thing “is for them to come clean.”

Elaine Sciolino reported from Vienna, and William J. Broad from New York.

 

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IAEA Report on Iran
   
November 16, 2007

  

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

 

Report by the Director General

1. On 30 August 2007, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2007/48 and Corr.1). This report covers the relevant developments since that date.

A. Implementation of the Work Plan on Outstanding Issues

2. On 21 August 2007, the Secretariat and Iran reached understandings on a work plan for resolving outstanding safeguards implementation issues (GOV/2007/48, Attachment). Since the previous report, the following progress has been made in the implementation of the work plan.

A.1. P-1 and P-2 Centrifuges

3. The chronology of activities since the previous report is as follows:

A.1.1. Acquisition of Fuel Cycle Facilities and Technology 1972–1995

4. According to Iran , in its early years, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) concluded a number of contracts with entities from France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States of America to enable it to acquire nuclear power and a wide range of related nuclear fuel cycle services, but after the 1979 revolution, these contracts with a total value of around $10 billion were not fulfilled. Iran noted that one of the contracts, signed in 1976, was for the development of a pilot plant for laser enrichment 1 . Senior Iranian officials said that, in the mid-1980s, Iran started working with many countries to revitalize its nuclear programme to meet the State's growing energy needs. Taking advantage of investments already made, Iran said it focused its efforts initially on the completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, working with entities from, inter alia, Argentina, France, Germany and Spain, but without success. At that time, Iran also initiated efforts to acquire research reactors from Argentina , China , India and the former Soviet Union , but also without success.

5. Parallel to the activities related to nuclear power plants, Iran started to build supporting infrastructure by establishing nuclear technology centres in Esfahan and Karaj . However, apart from uranium conversion technology acquired from an entity in China , Iran was not able to acquire other nuclear fuel cycle facilities or technology from abroad. As a result, according to Iran , a decision was made in the mid-1980s to acquire uranium enrichment technology on the black market.

6. To assess the detailed information provided by Iran , the Agency held discussions with senior current and former Iranian officials. The Agency also examined supporting documentation, including Iranian legislation, contracts with foreign companies, agreements with other States and nuclear site surveys.

7.  Bearing in mind the long history and complexity of the programme and the dual nature of enrichment technology, the Agency is not in a position, based on the information currently available to it, to draw conclusions about the original underlying nature of parts of the programme. Further light may be shed on this question when other aspects of the work plan have been addressed and when the Agency has been able to verify the completeness of Iran's declarations.

A.1.2. Acquisition of P-1 Centrifuge Technology

The 1987 Offer

8.  As previously reported to the Board (GOV/2005/67, paras 14–15), the Agency was shown by Iran in January 2005 a copy of a hand-written one-page document reflecting an offer for certain components and equipment said to have been made to Iran in 1987 by a foreign intermediary. Iran stated in 2005 that this was the only remaining documentary evidence relevant to the scope and content of the 1987 offer. On 9 October 2007, the Agency was provided with a copy of the document. Certain aspects of the document indicate that it dates from 1987. However, the originator of the document has still not been identified.

9. On 5 November 2007, Iran provided the Agency with an updated chronology of meetings between Iran and the supply network covering the period 1986 to 1987. Iran maintains that only some components of two disassembled centrifuges, plus supporting drawings and specifications, were delivered in 1987 by the network. Iran reiterated that it did not acquire uranium casting and re-conversion technology or equipment from the network, nor did it ask for the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF 6 to uranium metal, and its casting into hemispheres (GOV/2005/87, para. 6). These points are addressed in A.3 below.

10. According to Iran , the decision to acquire centrifuge technology was taken by the President of the AEOI and endorsed by the Prime Minister of Iran. In response to its enquiries about possible additional documentation relevant to the 1987 offer, the Agency was provided on 8 November 2007 with a copy of a confidential communication from the President of the AEOI to the Prime Minister, dated 28 February 1987, which also carried the Prime Minister's endorsement, dated 5 March 1987. In his communication, the AEOI President indicated that the activities “should be treated fully confidentially.” In response to the Agency's enquiry as to whether there was any military involvement in the programme, Iran has stated that no institution other than the AEOI was involved in the decision-making process or in the implementation of the centrifuge enrichment programme.

11. Based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network, limited documentation provided by Iran and procurement information collected through the Agency's independent investigations, the Agency has concluded that Iran's statements are consistent with other information available to the Agency concerning Iran's acquisition of declared P-1 centrifuge enrichment technology in 1987.

Early Research and Development

12. Iran has stated that, during the first phase of P-1 research and development (R&D) in 1987– 1993, it devoted only limited financial and human resources (three researchers) to the project. According to Iran , emphasis was put on understanding the behaviour of centrifuges and their assembly and on domestic production of components. Iran has also stated that during this period, the R&D work was conducted only by the AEOI, without the support of universities or the Physics Research Centre (PHRC). According to Iran , no contacts were made during this period with the supply network to seek support in solving technical problems which Iran had encountered.

13. Iran's statements about this phase of R&D are not inconsistent with the Agency's findings, which are based on interviews with available Iranian officials and members of the supply network, supporting documentation provided by Iran and procurement information collected during the Agency's investigations. However, the role of the technical university at which uranium particle contamination was found still needs to be examined (see A.2 below).

The 1993 Offer and Subsequent R&D

14. As previously reported to the Board (GOV/2006/15, para. 15), statements made by Iran and key members of the supply network about the events leading up to the mid-1990s offer have been at variance with each other. Over the course of meetings held in October 2007, Iran provided the Agency with an updated chronology of events from 1993 to 1999 which clarified certain details concerning meetings, participants and deliveries of P-1 centrifuge equipment by the network during this period.

15. Iran stated again that in 1993 the supply network, on its own initiative, had approached an Iranian company with an offer to sell enrichment technology. This offer was brought to the attention of the Head of Iran's Budget and Planning Organization, who was also a member of the country's Atomic Energy Council. The offer was then further pursued by the AEOI (GOV/2005/67, para. 16).

16. The Agency has so far not been able to confirm Iran's statement that the supply network initiated the 1993 offer. Information provided by Iran on the deliveries and technical meetings after 1993 is consistent with that given to the Agency in interviews with some of the network members. Based on interviews with Libyan officials and supply network members and information from other sources, the Agency has concluded that most of the items related to the 1993 offer had originally been ordered by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya but were in fact delivered to Iran in the period 1994–1996.

17. Iran stated that, during the period 1993 to 1999, it was still experiencing difficulty in producing components for P-1 centrifuges and manufacturing reliable P-1 centrifuges. It said that only limited human resources were devoted to the project until 1997 and that, around 1998, additional theoretical and experimental studies were initiated at the Amir Khabir University . Its statements in this regard are supported by the technical questions raised by AEOI staff with the network and procurement information available to the Agency.

18. Iran stated that it successfully tested P-1 centrifuges at the end of the 1990s and that a decision was made to go ahead with larger-scale R&D and eventually with an enrichment plant. To that end, Iran stated that it considered locations at Hashtgerd Karaj, Natanz and Esfahan before deciding to build the enrichment plant at Natanz. During this period, procurement activities were intensified and vacuum equipment, as well as special raw materials such as maraging steel and high strength aluminium, were acquired from abroad. Iran has provided names, locations and activities of the workshops involved in the domestic production of centrifuge components, most of which are owned by military industrial organizations (GOV/2004/11, para. 37). Information provided by Iran on the timing of these purchases and the quantities involved is consistent with the Agency's findings.

A.1.3. Acquisition of P-2 Centrifuge Technology

19. Iran has stated that, in order to compensate it for the poor quality of the P-1 centrifuge components provided by the supply network, the network provided Iran at a meeting in Dubai in 1996 with a full set of general P-2 centrifuge drawings. This statement was confirmed to the Agency in interviews with key members of the network.

20. Iran has reiterated that, although the drawings were acquired in 1996, no work on P-2 centrifuges was begun until 2002. According to the former and current senior management of the AEOI, Iran did not yet have the technical and scientific capabilities to master centrifuge manufacturing during this period. The Agency does not have credible procurement related information pointing to the actual acquisition by Iran of P-2 centrifuges or components during this period (an earlier indication which appeared to support this (GOV/2006/15, para. 18) could not be substantiated).

21. In 2002, the AEOI concluded a contract with a private company to manufacture a modified P-2 centrifuge (GOV/2004/11, para. 45). On 5 November 2007, the Agency received a copy of the contract, the content of which is consistent with earlier interviews with the company owner, who was not available for interview on this occasion. The contract was terminated in March 2003, but the company owner has stated that he continued to work “on his own initiative” until June 2003.

22. The owner of the company stated in earlier interviews that he was able to obtain all raw materials and minor items, with the exception of bearings, oils and magnets, from domestic sources, which is consistent with the procurement information currently available to the Agency. The owner stated that he acquired 150 magnets with P-2 specifications and attempted to buy tens of thousands more, but these orders were cancelled by the suppliers. The AEOI stated that, after termination of his contract with the AEOI, the company owner sought to secure the supply of additional magnets for the AEOI but that his attempts to do so failed, which is consistent with the information available to the Agency through its investigations. Iran acknowledged that composite rotors for P-2 centrifuges had been manufactured in a workshop situated on a Defence Industries Organisation (DIO) site (GOV/2004/34, para. 22).

23. Based on visits made by Agency inspectors to the P-2 workshop in 2004, examination of the company owner's contract, progress reports and logbooks, and information available on procurement enquiries, the Agency has concluded that Iran's statements on the content of the declared P-2 R&D activities are consistent with the Agency's findings. Environmental samples taken at declared R&D locations and from equipment did not indicate that nuclear material was used in these experiments.

A.2. Source of Contamination

24. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided Iran with questions in writing in connection with the source of uranium particle contamination at the technical university and requested access to relevant documentation and to individuals, as well as to relevant equipment and locations for sample-taking. The questions were, inter alia, about the origin of the uranium particle contamination of equipment (GOV/2006/53, para. 24), the nature of the equipment, the envisioned use of the equipment and the names and roles of individuals and entities involved (including PHRC). In accordance with the work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few weeks.

A.3. Uranium Metal Document

25. On 8 November 2007, the Agency received a copy of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF 6 to uranium metal and casting it into hemispheres. Iran has reiterated that this document was received along with the P-1 centrifuge documentation in 1987. The Agency has shared this document with Pakistan , the purported country of origin, and is seeking more information. Iran stated that the reconversion unit with casting equipment mentioned in the one-page 1987 offer was not pursued with the supply network. Apart from the conversion experiments of UF 4 to uranium metal at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (GOV/2004/60 Annex, para. 2), the Agency has seen no indication of any UF 6 reconversion and casting activity in Iran. It should be noted, however, that a small UF 6 to uranium metal conversion line in the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was declared by Iran in the design information questionnaire for the UCF (GOV/2003/75, Annex 1, para. 3). This line has not been built, as verified by the Agency's inspectors.

A.4. Polonium-210

26. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided questions in writing to Iran concerning Iran's activities involving polonium and requested access to relevant documentation, individuals and equipment. The questions were, inter alia, about the scope and objectives of the polonium-210 studies (GOV/2004/11, para. 28), whether any bismuth acquisitions from abroad had been made or attempted and whether any related theoretical or R&D studies had been carried out in Iran . In accordance with the work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few weeks.

A.5. Gchine Mine

27. On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided questions in writing to Iran concerning the Gchine Mine and requested access to relevant documentation, individuals and equipment. The questions were, inter alia, about the ownership of the mining area and mill, why activities took place at this location when suitable infrastructure was available elsewhere and why AEOI activities at the mine ceased around 1993 (GOV/2005/67, para. 26). In accordance with the work plan, Iran should provide answers to the questions and the requested access in the next few weeks.

A.6. Alleged Studies

28. The Agency has urged Iran to address at an early date the alleged studies concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF 4 (the green salt project), high explosive testing and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle (GOV/2006/15, paras 38–39). In accordance with the work plan, Iran should address this topic in the next few weeks. In the meantime, the Agency is working on arrangements for sharing with Iran documents provided by third parties related to the alleged studies.

A.7. Facility Attachment for the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant

29. On 17 and 18 September 2007, an Agency technical team discussed with the Iranian authorities details of a draft Facility Attachment for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz. Further discussions from 20 to 24 September led to the entry into force of the Facility Attachment on 30 September 2007.

 

B. Current Enrichment Related Activities

30. On 3 November 2007, the Agency verified that Iran had finished installing eighteen 164-machine cascades at FEP and that UF 6 had been fed into all 18 cascades. There has been no installation of centrifuges or centrifuge pipework outside the original 18-cascade area. Work to install feed and withdrawal infrastructure and auxiliary systems is continuing.

31. Since February 2007, Iran has fed approximately 1240 kg of UF 6 into the cascades at FEP. The feed rate has remained below the expected quantity for a facility of this design. While Iran has stated that it has reached enrichment levels up to 4.8% U-235 at FEP, the highest U-235 enrichment measured so far from the environmental samples taken by the Agency from cascade components and related equipment is 4.0%. Detailed nuclear material accountancy will be carried out during the annual physical inventory taking which is scheduled from 16 to 19 December 2007. Since March 2007, a total of seven unannounced inspections have been carried out at FEP.

32. Since August 2007, Iran has continued to test single centrifuge machines, the 10-and 20-machine cascades and one 164-machine cascade at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). Between 23 July and 22 October 2007, Iran fed 5 kg of UF 6 into the single machines; no nuclear material was fed into the cascades. From 15 to 18 September 2007, the Agency performed a physical inventory verification at PFEP. Although some of the sample results are not yet available, the Agency's provisional evaluation tends to confirm the physical inventory as declared by Iran .

33. There have been several press reports about statements by high level Iranian officials concerning R&D and testing of P-2 centrifuges by Iran (GOV/2006/27, para. 14). In a communication to the Agency received on 8 November 2007, Iran wrote: “ Iran voluntarily has informed the IAEA on the status of mechanical test (without UF 6 feeding) of new generation of centrifuge design.” In the communication, Iran added that it “agreed that exchanging of the new centrifuge generation information” would be discussed with the Agency in December 2007.

 

C. Reprocessing Activities

34. The Agency has continued monitoring the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (the MIX Facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) through inspections and design information verification. There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities.

 

D. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects

35. On 11 November 2007, the Agency conducted design information verification at the IR-40 and noted that construction of the facility was proceeding. Satellite imagery appears to indicate that the Heavy Water Production Plant is operating. The Agency must rely on satellite imagery of this plant as it does not have routine access to it while the Additional Protocol remains unimplemented.

 

E. Other Implementation Issues

E.1. Uranium Conversion

36. During the current conversion campaign at UCF, which began on 31 March 2007, approximately 78 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF 6 had been produced as of 5 November 2007. This brings the total amount of UF 6 produced at UCF since March 2004 to approximately 266 tonnes, all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance.

E.2. Design Information

37. On 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision to suspend the implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1. (GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14) 2 , but there has been no progress on this issue.

E.3. Other Matters

38. The Agency has made arrangements to verify and seal the fresh fuel foreseen for the Bushehr nuclear power plant on 26 November 2007, before shipment of the fuel from the Russian Federation to Iran .

F. Summary

39. The Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran . Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. Iran concluded a Facility Attachment for FEP. However, it should be noted that, since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the Agency's knowledge about Iran's current nuclear programme is diminishing.

40. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. Iran has also continued the construction of the IR-40 and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant.

41. There are two remaining major issues relevant to the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear programme: Iran's past and current centrifuge enrichment programme and the alleged studies. The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided on the declared past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes are consistent with its findings. The Agency will, however, continue to seek corroboration and is continuing to verify the completeness of Iran's declarations. The Agency intends in the next few weeks to focus on the contamination issue as well as the alleged studies and other activities that could have military applications.

42. Iran has provided sufficient access to individuals and has responded in a timely manner to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work plan. However, its cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive. As previously stated, Iran's active cooperation and full transparency are indispensable for full and prompt implementation of the work plan.

43. In addition, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about the scope and nature of its present programme. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme requires that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran . Although the Agency has no concrete information, other than that addressed through the work plan, about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran , the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran without full implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of Iran's undeclared activities for almost two decades and the need to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. Therefore, the Director General again urges Iran to implement the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date. The Director General also urges Iran to implement all the confidence building measures required by the Security Council, including the suspension of all enrichment related activities.

44. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

 

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The Politics of Reporting

on IAEA Reports

Farideh Farhi

Informed Comment: Public Affairs, November 16, 2007

 

It is always interesting to read the actual text of reports issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding Iran not only because of what they reveal about Iran’s program, but also because of the interestingly partial way various news organizations and governments end up interpreting or representing the report to audiences they are sure will not read the reports themselves.

The IAEA report that just came out [November 16, 2007] regarding Iran was much anticipated because of the agreement on a work plan between the IAEA and Iran regarding a time frame for the resolution of “outstanding issues” that had remained regarding Iran’s past activities. Based on this agreement Iran was expected to cooperate and effectively divulge information that would allow the IAEA to assess whether or not
Iran has come clean on its past activities. This process is still ongoing but the November report was expected to give a hint about the extent of Iranian cooperation.

The IAEA and its director Mohammad ElBaradei were heavily criticized by the United States and several European governments for the work plan because of its focus on Iran’s past activities or breaches and the possibility of the resolution of the questions regarding these past activities undercutting the force of the UN sanctions regime that demands suspension of Iran’s enrichment program. As such, the report issued on November 15 had to be, and is, very clear that “contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities.”

The IAEA report also states that “since early 2006 [this is when Iran suspended its voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol due to UN Security Council initiated sanctions against Iran], the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As result, the Agency’s knowledge about
Iran’s current programme is diminishing.”

On the remaining major issues relevant to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear program, however, the report paints a cooperative picture of Iran and states: “The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided on the declared past P-1 and P-2 centrifuge programmes are consistent with its findings. The Agency will, however, continue to seek corroboration and is continuing to verify the completeness of Iran’s declarations.” This is not a statement of closure of the issue as the Iranian leaders are claiming but is an important steep forward. In fact, the language of Iran providing information that is “consistent with the Agency’s findings” or “information available to the Agency” from other sources is repeated several times in the report regarding a variety of issues.

Also positively reported is Iran’s level of cooperation. The report explicitly states that “Iran has provided sufficient access to individuals and has responded in a timely manner to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on issues raised in the context of the work plan. However its cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive.” This I take to mean that
Iran has responded to questions and cooperated in specific areas when asked but not before. The IAEA clearly wants Iran to engage in “active cooperation and full transparency” in a proactive manner but the report does not state that Iran’s reactive approach has led to lack of cooperation as agreed upon in the work plan.

Finally, the IAEA is also quite explicit that “the Agency has been able to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material, and has provided the required nuclear accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities.” But, as mentioned above, the Agency wants Iran to implement the Additional Protocol to prevent its “diminishing” knowledge of Iran’s current program (this is by the way something
Iran has said, at least in the past, that it will do if Iran’s nuclear dossier returns to the IAEA).

So a close reading of the report suggests that the IAEA is unhappy with Iran’s continuation of enrichment (because it is contrary to the Security Council decisions) and would like Iran to voluntarily implement the Additional Protocol as it did in the past. At the same time, the report suggests good progress on the issue of Iran’s past activities. It also reveals no evidence of diversion to a weapons program despite “a total of seven unannounced inspections” carried out which are beyond Iran’s current NPT obligations (as I understand it, IAEA inspectors have been issued multiple entry visas to enter Iran as they wish).

I lay the report out in detail because I think it is important as a backdrop to the hesitance shown by Russia and China in approving another set of sanctions against
Iran before IAEA’s engagement with Iran through the work plan is finished.

But as I said above it is also interesting and quite revealing to see how the report itself is reported. In Iran, the statements about non-diversion and consistency with the Agency’s findings are trumpeted by government officials as an affirmation of
Iran’s righteousness. The United States government, on the other hand, has found the report inadequate and in fact has immediately called for a Security Council meeting to discuss a new round of sanctions (a meeting China reportedly initially refused to attend but has now reluctantly agreed to do so after Thanksgiving)

These are expected governmental positions. Perhaps also not too unexpectedly, the American newspapers and news agencies also do seem a bit too willing to tow the
U.S. government line. The New York Times, in a piece entitled “Report Raises New Doubts on Iran’s Nuclear Program,” reports that the Agency “said in a report on Thursday that Iran had made new but incomplete disclosures about its past nuclear activities, missing a critical deadline under an agreement with the agency and virtually assuring a new push by the United States to impose stricter international sanctions.” No where in text of this piece, however, there is anything about what these “new doubts” are or where exactly the report has said that a critical deadline has been passed. Also not referred to are the explicit statements about non-diversion of nuclear material and consistency with the Agency’s findings.

The piece goes on to say, “the report made clear that even while providing some answers, Iran has continued to shield many aspects of its nuclear program.” The report says no such thing but the NYT piece takes the report’s reference to Iran’s “reactive rather than proactive” cooperation, mentioned in the paragraph about Iran’s “sufficient” and “timely” cooperation with the work plan, along with the suspension of the Additional Protocol (calling it instead “restrictions Iran has placed on inspectors”) as the reasons for why the “agency’s understanding of the full scope of Iran’s nuclear program is diminishing” and represents this as a "shielding" by Iran.

The Associated Press’ heading is “IAEA: Iran Not Open About Nuke Program,” while the opening of the piece is: “The U.S. called for new sanctions against Iran after a U.N. report Thursday that said the Tehran regime has been generally truthful about key aspects of its past nuclear activities, but is continuing to enrich uranium.”

After several changes in the Internet versions, the Washington Post’s heading ended up slightly less provocative (“U.S. to Seek New Sanctions against Iran: UN Report Faults Tehran’s Input on Nuclear Program”). But the text begins by saying “The Bush administration plans to push for new sanctions against Iran after the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency reported yesterday that Tehran is providing "diminishing" information about its controversial nuclear program, U.S. officials said. In a critically timed assessment, the International Atomic Energy Agency said that Iran provided "timely" and helpful new information on a secret program that became public in 2002, but that it did not fully answer questions or allow full access to Iranian personnel. Iran is even less cooperative on its current program, the IAEA reported.” This reporting is not only flatly wrong regarding what the report said about full access to Iranian personnel but also completely mum, like the reporting from AP and NYT, about the reasons for the “diminishing” information (the suspension of the voluntary implementation of the Additional Protocol which was instigated by the Security Council action).

If you are wondering if there is reporting that accurately uses the language used by the IAEA findings, I think the BBC piece entitled “Mixed UN Nuclear Report for Iran,” although short and still mum on the reasons for why the Additional Protocol is no longer voluntarily implemented by Iran, gives a relatively accurate description of the issues involved. So it can be done! Why it is not, make a guess….

 

 

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Derestricted 5 March 2008

(This document has been derestricted at the meeting of the Board on 5 March 2008)

Board of Governors

GOV/2008/4

Date: 22 February 2008 Original: English

For official use only

Item 5(c) of the provisional agenda (GOV/2008/6)

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards

Agreement and relevant provisions of Security

Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747

(2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

1.                On 15 November 2007, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2007/58). This report covers the relevant developments since that date.

2.                On 11 and 12 January 2008, the Director General met in Tehran with H.E. Ayatollah A. Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran; H.E. Mr. M. Ahmadinejad, President of Iran; H.E. Mr. G. Aghazadeh, Vice President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI); H.E. Mr. M. Mottaki, Foreign Minister; and H.E. Mr. S. Jalili, Secretary, Supreme National Security Council of Iran. The purpose of the visit was to discuss ways and means of implementing all relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council as well as accelerating implementation of the work plan agreed between Iran and the Secretariat on 21 August 2007 aimed at the clarification of outstanding safeguards implementation issues (GOV/2007/48, Attachment).

3. During the discussions, the Iranian leadership stated that the country’s nuclear programme had always been exclusively for peaceful purposes and that there had never been a nuclear weapons development programme. The Iranian authorities agreed to accelerate implementation of the work plan.


 

A. Implementation of the Work Plan on Outstanding Issues

A.1. Source of Contamination

4.              On 15 September 2007, the Agency provided Iran with questions relating to the source of the uranium particle contamination found on some equipment at a technical university, the nature of the equipment, the envisioned use of the equipment and the names and roles of individuals and entities involved, including the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) (GOV/2007/58, para. 24). This equipment was procured by the former head of PHRC, who had also been a professor at the university. He had also procured, or attempted to procure, other equipment, such as balancing machines, mass spectrometers, magnets and fluorine handling equipment, which could be useful in uranium enrichment activities (GOV/2006/27, para. 25).

5.              On 10–12 December 2007 and on 15–16 December 2007, meetings took place in Tehran between the Agency and Iranian officials during which Iran provided answers to the questions and the Agency requested additional clarifications regarding the intended purpose of the equipment, the persons and entities who had requested the items, the recipients, and the use and locations, both past and present, of the equipment. In a follow-up letter dated 18 December 2007, the Agency provided Iran with further details regarding the equipment.

6.            In a letter dated 3 January 2008, the Agency reminded Iran that Iran needed to provide additional clarifications to allow a full assessment of the issue of the source of contamination and procurement efforts.

7.            In a letter dated 8 January 2008, Iran provided answers to the questions raised by the Agency in
its letter of 3 January 2008.

A.1.1. Use of Equipment and Source of Contamination

8.            According to Iran, vacuum equipment was procured in 1990 on behalf of the technical university by the former Head of PHRC because of his expertise in procurement and PHRC's business connections. The equipment was intended to be used at the Physics Department of the technical university for the coating of items such as optical mirrors, optical lasers, laser mirrors, resistive layers for solar cells and mirrors for use in medical operating theatres.

9.            Iran stated that, upon receipt of the equipment in 1991, it was noticed that the delivery was incomplete and that some incorrect parts had been supplied. The equipment was therefore put into storage at the university. Iran further stated that a number of letters of complaint were written to the supplier company at intervals until 1994, but to no avail.

10.        According to Iran, some individual pieces of equipment were used both inside and outside the university during the period 1994–2003 in research, operation and maintenance activities involving vacuum conditions, but other parts of the consignment were never used. As its explanation of how the contamination had come about, Iran said that, in 1998, an individual who was testing used centrifuge components from Pakistan at the laboratory at Vanak Square for the AEOI (GOV/2004/34, para. 31) had asked the vacuum service of the university to come and repair a pump. Iran stated that some items of the vacuum equipment mentioned above were used for this repair activity and that, when these items were eventually brought back to the university, they spread uranium particle contamination.

11.          To assess the information provided by Iran, the Agency spoke with the individual from the Vanak Square laboratory and the vacuum technician from the university who had carried out the repairs. The Agency was also shown the pump that had been repaired using the equipment concerned. The Agency made a detailed analysis of the signatures of the contamination of the equipment and compared them with those of the swipe samples taken from the centrifuge components in Iran which had originated in Pakistan. The Agency concluded that the explanation and supporting documentation provided by Iran regarding the possible source of contamination by uranium particles at the university were not inconsistent with the data currently available to the Agency. The Agency considers this question no longer outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues, in accordance with its procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify this issue as part of its verification of the completeness of Iran’s declarations.

A.1.2. Procurement activities by the former Head of PHRC

12.          According to Iran, none of the equipment purchased or enquired about by the former Head of PHRC (see para. 4 above) was intended for use in uranium enrichment or conversion related activities, whether for research and development (R&D) or for educational activities in these fields. Procurements and procurement attempts by the former Head of PHRC were said by Iran to have also been made on behalf of other entities of Iran, as described below.

13.          Iran stated that the vacuum equipment purchased by the Head of PHRC had been intended for educational purposes in the Vacuum Technique Laboratory of the university, specifically for use in experiments by students on thin layer production using evaporation and vacuum techniques, coating using vacuum systems and leak detection in vacuum systems. To support its statements, Iran presented instruction manuals related to the various experiments, internal communications on the procurement of the equipment and shipping documents. Agency inspectors visited the Vacuum Technique Laboratory and confirmed the presence of the equipment there.

14.          Iran stated that some magnets had also been purchased by the Head of the PHRC on behalf of the Physics Department of the university for educational purposes in “Lenz-Faraday experiments”. To support this statement, Iran presented a number of documents: instruction manuals related to the experiments; requests for funding which indicated that a decision had been made to approach the Head of PHRC to order and purchase the parts; and an invoice for cash sales from the supplier. Iran stated that the magnets were discarded after being used.

15.          According to Iran, the Head of PHRC attempted twice — once successfully — to buy a balancing machine for the Mechanical Engineering Department of the university for educational purposes, such as in the measurement of vibrations and forces in rotating components due to unbalancing. To support Iran’s statement, the Agency was shown laboratory experiment procedures, requests about procurement and a letter confirming the completion of the purchase. Agency inspectors visited the Mechanical Engineering Department and confirmed the presence of the balancing machine there.

16.          According to Iran, the Head of PHRC also attempted to purchase 45 gas cylinders, each containing 2.2 kg of fluorine, on behalf of the Office of Industrial Interrelations of the university. Iran stated that the intended purpose of the fluorine had been to enhance the chemical stability of polymeric vessels. To support its statements, Iran presented a request to buy fluorine and a communication between the Head of PHRC and the President of the university about the proposed supplier’s refusal to deliver the goods.

17.          Iran stated that the AEOI had encountered difficulties with procurement because of international sanctions imposed on the country, and that that was why the AEOI had requested the Dean of the university to assist in the procurement of a UF6 mass spectrometer. According to Iran, in 1988, the Dean of the university approached the Head of the Mechanics Workshop of the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG), which belonged to the Ministry of Sepah, and asked him to handle the procurement. According to Iran, the mass spectrometer was never delivered. The Head of the Mechanics Workshop, who was later appointed Head of PHRC when it was established in 1989, is the same person involved in the other procurement attempts mentioned above.

18. The Agency took note of the information and supporting documents provided by Iran as well as the statements made by the former Head of PHRC to the Agency and concluded that the replies were not inconsistent with the stated use of the equipment. The role and activities of PHRC will be further addressed in connection with the alleged studies as discussed below.

A.2. Uranium Metal Document

19. On 8 November 2007, the Agency received a copy from Iran of the 15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and the machining of enriched uranium metal into hemispheres, which are components of nuclear weapons. Iran reiterated that this document had been received along with the P-1 centrifuge documentation in 1987 and that it had not been requested by Iran. The Agency is still waiting for a response from Pakistan on the circumstances of the delivery of this document in order to understand the full scope and content of the offer made by the network in 1987 (GOV/2006/15, paras 20–22).

A.3. Polonium-210

20.        Polonium-210 is of interest to the Agency because it can be used not only for civilian applications (such as radioisotope batteries), but also — in conjunction with beryllium — for military purposes, such as neutron initiators in some designs of nuclear weapons. On 20–21 January 2008, a meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and Iranian officials during which Iran provided answers to the questions raised by the Agency in its letter dated 15 September 2007 regarding polonium-210 research (GOV/2007/58, para. 26). The Agency’s questions included a request to see the original project documentation.

21.        According to Iran, in the 1980s, scientists from the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre (TNRC) were asked to propose new research activities. A project called “Production of 210Po by the irradiation of 209Bi in the TNRC reactor” was proposed and eventually approved by the Scientific Advisory Committee of TNRC in 1988. The project consisted of fundamental research aimed at enhancing knowledge about this process. According to Iran, it was not aimed at a specific immediate application. However, a potential use in radioisotope batteries, if the chemical extraction of polonium-210 proved successful, was mentioned in the initial proposal.

22.        Iran reiterated that the project was not part of any larger R&D project, but had been a personal initiative of the project leader. According to Iran, the chemist working on the project left the country before full chemical processing had been performed, the project was aborted and the decayed samples were discarded as waste (GOV/2004/11, para. 30).

23.          To support its statements, Iran presented additional copies of papers and literature searches that had formed the basis for the request for approval of the project. Iran also provided copies of the project proposal, the meeting minutes and the approval document from the Scientific Advisory Committee of TNRC, as well as a complete copy of the reactor logbook for the entire period that the samples were present in the reactor.

24. Based on an examination of all information provided by Iran, the Agency concluded that the explanations concerning the content and magnitude of the polonium-210 experiments were consistent with the Agency’s findings and with other information available to it. The Agency considers this question no longer outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues, in accordance with its procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify this issue as part of its verification of the completeness of Iran’s declarations.

 

A.4. Gchine Mine

25.          On 22 and 23 January 2008, a meeting took place in Tehran between the Agency and Iranian officials during which Iran provided answers to the questions raised by the Agency in its letter dated 15 September 2007 (GOV/2007/58, para. 27) with a view to achieving a better understanding of the complex arrangements governing the past and current administration of the Gchine uranium mine and mill (GOV/2005/67, paras 26–31).

26.        According to Iran, the exploitation of uranium at the Gchine mine, as well as the ore processing activities at the Gchine uranium ore concentration (UOC) plant, have always been and remain the responsibility of the AEOI.

27.        Iran stated that, by 1989, the extent of uranium reserves at Saghand in central Iran had been established in cooperation with Chinese experts. Considering the promising output of this region, a contract for equipping the Saghand mine and designing a uranium ore processing plant was concluded with Russian companies in 1995. Insufficient funding was allocated in the Government’s 1994–1998 five-year plan for the AEOI to pursue activities at both Gchine and Saghand. Since there was more uranium (estimated 1000 tonnes) at Saghand than at Gchine (estimated 40 tonnes), it was decided to spend the available funds on Saghand.

28.        According to Iran, in the period 1993–1998, tasks such as the preparation of technical reports and studies, and some chemical testing of ores, were performed at the AEOI Ore Processing Center (OPC) at TNRC. The focus of some of the documentation work had been to justify funding of Gchine in the 1999–2003 five-year plan. These efforts were successful and funding for further exploration and exploitation at Gchine was approved in the plan. A decision to construct a UOC plant at Gchine, known as “Project 5/15”, was made on 25 August 1999.

29.        During the 22–23 January 2008 meetings, Iran also provided the Agency with supporting documentation regarding the budget, the five-year plans, contracts with foreign entities and the preparation of studies and reports. The Agency concluded that the documentation was sufficient to confirm the AEOI’s continuing interest in and activity at Gchine in the 1993–1999 period.

30.        Regarding the origin and role of the Kimia Maadan (KM) Company, Iran stated that the OPC, in addition to its own staff, had hired consultants and experts for various projects, including for work relating to Gchine. When budget approval was given in 1999 for exploration and exploitation at Gchine, some experts and consultants had formed a company (KM) to take on a contract from the AEOI for the Gchine plant. Supporting documentation was provided to the Agency showing that KM was registered as a company on 4 May 2000. Iran stated that KM’s core staff of about half a dozen people consisted of experts who had previously worked for the OPC. At the peak of activity, the company employed over 100 people. In addition to its own staff, KM made use of experts from universities and subcontractors to work on the project.

31.        According to Iran, KM was given conceptual design information by the AEOI consisting of drawings and technical reports. KM’s task was to do the detailed design, to procure and install equipment and to put the Gchine UOC plant into operation. The contract imposed time constraints and the time pressure led to some mistakes being made. After the detailed design was completed, changes had to be made which led to financial problems for KM.

32.        Iran stated that KM had had only one project — the one with the AEOI for construction of the Gchine UOC plant on a turnkey basis. However, the company had also helped with procurement for the AEOI because of the AEOI’s procurement constraints due to sanctions (GOV/2006/1 5, para. 39). A document listing items procured for the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) was provided by Iran. According to Iran, because of KM’s financial problems, the company ceased work on the Gchine project in June 2003, when the three-year contract with the AEOI came to an end. Iran stated that KM was officially deregistered on 8 June 2003 and provided a document supporting this statement. After KM stopped work, the OPC again took over work on the Gchine UOC plant.

33.        Iran stated that KM had been able to progress quickly from its creation in May 2000 and to install foundations for the UOC plant by late December 2000 because the conceptual design for the plant had been done by the OPC. This conceptual design and other “know-how” had been supplied to KM, which used the information for the detailed design of processing equipment. KM was therefore quickly able to prepare drawings and issue purchase orders. Documents supporting the conceptual work done by the AEOI were presented to the Agency by Iran.

34.        Much of the supporting information provided by Iran had not been presented to the Agency during past discussions about Gchine. The Agency concluded that the information and explanations provided by Iran were supported by the documentation, the content of which is consistent with the information already available to the Agency. The Agency considers this question no longer outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues, in accordance with its procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and continues to verify this issue as part of verification of the completeness of Iran’s declarations.

A.5. Alleged Studies

35.          The Agency has continued to urge Iran, as demanded by the Security Council, to address the alleged studies concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide (UO2) into uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) (the green salt project), high explosives testing and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle, which could have a military nuclear dimension and which appear to have administrative interconnections, and in view of their possible link to nuclear material (GOV/2007/58, para. 28). As part of the work plan, Iran agreed to address these alleged studies.

36.          On 27 and 28 January 2008 and from 3 to 5 February 2008, the Agency and Iran discussed the alleged studies at meetings in Tehran. During these discussions, the Agency provided detailed information about the allegations and asked for clarification concerning other issues that had arisen during the implementation of the work plan, including the roles of PHRC, KM, the Education Research Institute (ERI) and the Institute of Applied Physics (IAP) (GOV/2004/83, paras 100–101).

37.          The Agency showed Iran certain documentation which the Agency had been given by other Member States, purportedly originating from Iran, including a flowsheet of bench scale conversion of UO2 to UF4. The documents show a capacity of the process of about 1 tonne per year of UF4. The flowsheet has KM markings on it and refers to “Project 5/13.” The documentation includes communications between the project staff and another private company on the acquisition of process instrumentation. These communications also make reference to the leadership of the project concerning the missile re-entry vehicle. The Agency also presented a sketch of a process to produce 50 tonnes of UF4 per year.

38.        Iran stated that the allegations were baseless and that the information which the Agency had shown to Iran was fabricated. However, Iran agreed to clarify its statement in detail. On 8 February and 12 February 2008, the Agency reiterated in writing its request for additional clarifications. On 14 February 2008, Iran responded, reiterating its earlier statements and declaring that this was its final assessment on this point. Iran stated that the only organization that had been, and was, involved in fuel cycle activities was the AEOI and that the AEOI had had a contract with KM to develop a UOC plant in Gchine, which was the only project in which KM was ever involved. In Iran’s view, the flowsheet was a fabrication and the accusation baseless.

39. During the meetings on 3–5 February 2008, the Agency made available documents for examination by Iran and provided additional technical information related to: the testing of high voltage detonator firing equipment; the development of an exploding bridgewire detonator (EBW); the simultaneous firing of multiple EBW detonators; and the identification of an explosive testing arrangement that involved the use of a 400 m shaft and a firing capability remote from the shaft by a distance of 10 km, all of which the Agency believes would be relevant to nuclear weapon R&D. Iran stated that the documents were fabricated and that the information contained in those documents could easily be found in open sources. During the meetings mentioned above, the Agency also described parameters and development work related to the Shahab 3 missile, in particular technical aspects of a re-entry vehicle, and made available to Iran for examination a computer image provided by other Member States showing a schematic layout of the contents of the inner cone of a re-entry vehicle. This layout has been assessed by the Agency as quite likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device. Iran stated that its missile programme involved the use of conventional warheads only and was also part of the country’s space programme, and that the schematic layout shown by the Agency was baseless and fabricated.

40.        During the meetings of 27–28 January and 3–5 February 2008, the Agency asked Iran to clarify a number of procurement actions by the ERI, PHRC and IAP which could relate to the above-mentioned alleged studies. These included training courses on neutron calculations, the effect of shock waves on metal, enrichment/isotope separation and ballistic missiles. Efforts to procure spark gaps, shock wave software, neutron sources, special steel parts (GOV/2006/15, para. 37) and radiation measurement equipment, including borehole gamma spectrometers, were also made. In its written response on 5 February 2008, Iran stated that ‘PAM shock’ software was enquired about “in order to study aircraft, collision of cars, airbags and for the design of safety belts.” Iran also stated that the radiation monitors it had enquired about were meant to be used for radiation protection purposes. Iran’s response regarding the efforts to procure training courses on neutron calculations, and enrichment/isotope separation, spark gaps, shock wave software, neutron sources and radiation measurement equipment for borehole gamma spectrometers is still awaited.

41.        During the same meetings, the Agency requested clarification of the roles of certain officials and institutes and their relation to nuclear activities. Iran was also asked to clarify projects such as the so-called “Project 4” (possibly uranium enrichment) and laser related R&D activities. Iran denied the existence of some of the organizations and project offices referred to in the documentation and denied that other organizations named were involved in nuclear related activities. Iran also denied the existence of some of the people named in the documentation and said allegations about the roles of other people named were baseless. Iran’s response to the Agency’s request regarding “Project 4” and laser related R&D activities is still awaited

42.          On 15 February 2008, the Agency proposed a further meeting to show additional documentation on the alleged studies to Iran, after being authorized to do so by the countries which had provided it. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency’s proposal.

B. Current Enrichment Related Activities

43.          On 12 December 2007, the first physical inventory taking was carried out at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) in Natanz and verified by the Agency. Since the beginning of operations in February 2007, a total of 1670 kg of UF6 had been fed into the cascades. The operator presented, inter alia, about 75 kg of UF6 as the product, with a stated enrichment of 3.8% U-235. The throughput of the facility has been well below its declared design capacity. There has been no installation of centrifuges outside the original 18-cascade area. Installation work, including equipment and sub-header pipes, is continuing for other cascade areas. Since March 2007, a total of nine unannounced inspections have been carried out at FEP. All nuclear material at FEP remains under Agency containment and surveillance.

44.          On 8 November 2007, Iran stated that it “agreed that exchanging of the new centrifuge generation information” would be discussed with the Agency in December 2007 (GOV/2007/58, para. 33). On 13 January 2008, the Director General and Deputy Director General for Safeguards visited an AEOI R&D laboratory at Kalaye Electric, where they were given information on R&D activities being carried out there. These included work on four different centrifuge designs: two subcritical rotor designs, a rotor with bellows and a more advanced centrifuge. Iran informed the Agency that the R&D laboratory was developing centrifuge components, measuring equipment and vacuum pumps with the aim of having entirely indigenous production capabilities in Iran.

45.          On 15 January 2008, Iran informed the Agency about the planned installation of the first new generation subcritical centrifuge (IR-2) at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and provided relevant design information. On 29 January 2008, the Agency confirmed that a single IR-2 test machine and a 10-machine IR-2 test cascade had been installed at PFEP. Iran reported that about 0.8 kg of UF6 had been fed to the single machine between 22 and 27 January 2008. Iran has continued to test P-1 centrifuges in one single machine, one 10-, one 20- and one 164-machine cascade at PFEP. Between 23 October 2007 and 21 January 2008, Iran fed a total of about 8 kg of UF6 into the single P-1 and the 10-machine P-1 cascade; no nuclear material was fed into the 20- and 164-machine cascades. At the end of January 2008, the single P-1 machine and the 10- and 20-machine P-1 cascades were dismantled and the space was used for the new IR-2 machines. All activities took place under Agency containment and surveillance.

46. On 5 February 2008, the Deputy Director General for Safeguards and the Director of Safeguards Operations B visited laboratories at Lashkar Abad, where laser enrichment activities had taken place in 2003 and earlier. The laboratories are now run by a private company, which is producing and developing laser equipment for industrial purposes. All the former laser equipment has been dismantled and some of it is stored at the site. The management of the company provided detailed information on current and planned activities, including plans for extensive new construction work, and stated that they are not carrying out, and are not planning, any uranium enrichment activities.

C. Reprocessing Activities

47. The Agency has continued monitoring the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (the MIX Facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) through inspections and design information verification. There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. In addition, Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related R&D activities in Iran, which the Agency can confirm only with respect to these facilities.

D. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects

48. On 5 February 2008, the Agency carried out design information verification at the IR-40 and noted that construction of the facility was ongoing. The Agency has continued to monitor the construction of the Heavy Water Production Plant using satellite imagery. The imagery appears to indicate that the plant is operating.

E. Other Implementation Issues

E.1. Uranium Conversion

49. During the current conversion campaign at UCF, which began on 31 March 2007, approximately 120 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 had been produced as of 2 February 2008. This brings the total amount of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 to 309 tonnes, all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance. Iran has stated that it is carrying out no uranium conversion related R&D activities other than those at Esfahan.

E.2. Design Information

50. On 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision to suspend the implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1. (GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14), but there has been no progress on this issue. However, Iran has provided updated design information for PFEP.

E.3. Other Matters

51. On 26 November 2007, the Agency verified and sealed in the Russian Federation the fresh fuel foreseen for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), before its shipment to Iran. As of February 2008, all fuel assemblies had been received, verified and re-sealed at BNPP.

F. Summary

52. The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. Iran has also responded to questions and provided clarifications and amplifications on the issues raised in the context of the work plan, with the exception of the alleged studies. Iran has provided access to individuals in response to the Agency’s requests. Although direct access has not been provided to individuals said to be associated with the alleged studies, responses have been provided in writing to some of the Agency’s questions.

53.          The Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided by Iran, in accordance with the work plan, are consistent with its findings — in the case of the polonium-210 experiments and the Gchine mine — or are not inconsistent with its findings — in the case of the contamination at the technical university and the procurement activities of the former Head of PHRC. Therefore, the Agency considers those questions no longer outstanding at this stage. However, the Agency continues, in accordance with its procedures and practices, to seek corroboration of its findings and to verify these issues as part of its verification of the completeness of Iran’s declarations.

54.          The one major remaining issue relevant to the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle. This is a matter of serious concern and critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to Iran’s nuclear programme. The Agency was able to show some relevant documentation to Iran on 3–5 February 2008 and is still examining the allegations made and the statements provided by Iran in response. Iran has maintained that these allegations are baseless and that the data have been fabricated. The Agency’s overall assessment requires, inter alia, an understanding of the role of the uranium metal document, and clarifications concerning the procurement activities of some military related institutions still not provided by Iran. The Agency only received authorization to show some further material to Iran on 15 February 2008. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency’s request of that same date for Iran to view this additional documentation on the alleged studies. In light of the above, the Agency is not yet in a position to determine the full nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. However, it should be noted that the Agency has not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it have credible information in this regard. The Director General has urged Iran to engage actively with the Agency in a more detailed examination of the documents available about the alleged studies which the Agency has been authorized to show to Iran.

55.          The Agency has recently received from Iran additional information similar to that which Iran had previously provided pursuant to the Additional Protocol, as well as updated design information. As a result, the Agency’s knowledge about Iran’s current declared nuclear programme has become clearer. However, this information has been provided on an ad hoc basis and not in a consistent and complete manner. The Director General has continued to urge Iran to implement the Additional Protocol at the earliest possible date and as an important confidence building measure requested by the Board of Governors and affirmed by the Security Council. The Director General has also urged Iran to implement the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information. Iran has expressed its readiness to implement the provisions of the Additional Protocol and the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1, “if the nuclear file is returned from the Security Council to the IAEA”.

56.          Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. In addition, Iran started the development of new generation centrifuges. Iran has also continued construction of the IR-40 reactor and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant.

57.        With regard to its current programme, Iran needs to continue to build confidence about its scope and nature. Confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme requires that the Agency be able to provide assurances not only regarding declared nuclear material, but, equally importantly, regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. With the exception of the issue of the alleged studies, which remains outstanding, the Agency has no concrete information about possible current undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Although Iran has provided some additional detailed information about its current activities on an ad hoc basis, the Agency will not be in a position to make progress towards providing credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran before reaching some clarity about the nature of the alleged studies, and without implementation of the Additional Protocol. This is especially important in the light of the many years of undeclared activities in Iran and the confidence deficit created as a result. The Director General therefore urges Iran to implement all necessary measures called for by the Board of Governors and the Security Council to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

58.          The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.


 

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United Nations Security Council

 

 

Resolution 1803 Adopted March 3, 2008

 

 

SecurityCouncil                                                                                           

 

S/RES/1803 (2008)

 

 

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5848th meeting, on 3 March 2008

The Security Council,

Recalling the Statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006 and its resolution 1747 (2007) of 24 March 2007, and reaffirming their provisions,

Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/22), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), and 1747 (2007), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,

Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, emphasizing that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the Agency’s right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right,

08-25781 (E) 11111082578111111


 

which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility,

Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commending the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme in the work plan between the Secretariat of the IAEA and Iran (GOV/2007/48, Attachment), welcoming the progress in implementation of this work plan as reflected in the IAEA Director General’s reports of 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), underlining the importance

of Iran producing tangible results rapidly and effectively by completing implementation of this work plan including by providing answers to all the questions the IAEA asks so that the Agency, through the implementation of the required transparency measures, can assess the completeness and correctness of Iran’s declaration,

Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution, that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,

Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/52 1), and noting the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored, it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Having regard to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,

Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Actions Task Force (FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolution 1737 (2006),

Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1.                       Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006), and underlines that the IAEA has sought confirmation that Iran will apply Code 3.1 modified;

2.        Welcomes the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and progress made in this regard as set out in the Director General’s report of 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), encourages the IAEA to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues, stresses that this would help to re-establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and supports the IAEA in strengthening its safeguards on Iran’s nuclear activities in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA;

3.        Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I to resolution 1747 (2007) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006);

4.        Underlines that nothing in paragraph 3 above requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) and resolution 1747 (2007), including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

5.        Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex II to this resolution as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

   6.                   Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 above shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;

7.            Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annexes I and III to this resolution, and any persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them and to persons and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

8.            Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:

(a)          all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2 of document S/2006/8 14, except the supply, sale or transfer, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006), of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in sections 1 and 2 of the Annex to that document, and sections 3 to 6 as notified in advance to the Committee, only when for exclusive use in light water reactors, and where such supply, sale or transfer is necessary for technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices as provided for in paragraph 16 of resolution 1737 (2006);

(b)          all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in 19.A.3 of Category II of document S/2006/815;

9.        Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade, in order to avoid such financial support contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

10.         Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

11.         Calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspect the cargoes to and from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

12.         Requires all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph above is undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days awritten report on the inspection containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place, circumstances, results and other relevant details;

13.     Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above;

14.     Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the measures imposed in resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution;

15.     Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote resumption of dialogue, and consultations on the basis of their offer to Iran, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this issue which would allow for the development of all-round relations and wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and inter alia, starting direct talks and negotiation with Iran as long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA;

16.     Encourages the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks;

17.     Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by the present resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

18.     Requests within 90 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

19. Reaffirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to in the paragraph above, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcomes;

(b)      that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), and in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c)      that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

20. Decides to remain seized of the matter. Annex I

1.        Amir Moayyed Alai (involved in managing the assembly and engineering of centrifuges)

2.        Mohammad Fedai Ashiani (involved in the production of ammonium uranyl carbonate and management of the Natanz enrichment complex)

3.            Abbas Rezaee Ashtiani (a senior official at the AEOI Office of Exploration and Mining Affairs)

4.            Haleh Bakhtiar (involved in the production of magnesium at a concentration of 99.9%)

5.        Morteza Behzad (involved in making centrifuge components)

6.        Dr. Mohammad Eslami (Head of Defence Industries Training and Research Institute)

7.            Seyyed Hussein Hosseini (AEOI official involved in the heavy water research reactor project at Arak)

8.        M. Javad Karimi Sabet (Head of Novin Energy Company, which is designated under resolution 1747 (2007))

9.        Hamid-Reza Mohajerani (involved in production management at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan)

10.     Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi (former Deputy Chief of Armed Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of State Anti-Smuggling Headquarters, engaged in efforts to get round the sanctions imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007))

11.     Houshang Nobari (involved in the management of the Natanz enrichment complex)

12.     Abbas Rashidi (involved in enrichment work at Natanz)

13.     Ghasem Soleymani (Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand
Uranium Mine)


 

Annex II

A.               Individuals listed in resolution 1737 (2006)

1.            Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development

2.            Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)

3.         Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager (Arak)

B.        Individuals listed in resolution 1747 (2007)

1.               Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)

2.            Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Center, which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)

Annex III

1.        Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (BK Co.) (involved in the production of centrifuge components)

2.            Barzagani Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies (subsidiary of Saccal System companies) (this company tried to purchase sensitive goods for an entity listed in resolution 1737 (2006))

3.        Electro Sanam Company (E. S. Co./E. X. Co.) (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)

4.            Ettehad Technical Group (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)

5.            Industrial Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery (aka Instrumentation Factories Plant) (used by AIO for some acquisition attempts)

6.            Jabber Ibn Hayan (AEOI laboratory involved in fuel-cycle activities)

7.            Joza Industrial Co. (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)

8.            Khorasan Metallurgy Industries (subsidiary of the Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG) which depends on DIO. Involved in the production of centrifuges components)

9.        Niru Battery Manufacturing Company (subsidiary of the DIO. Its role is to manufacture power units for the Iranian military including missile systems)

10.     Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries (has participated in construction of the Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan)

11.       Safety Equipment Procurement (SEP) (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)

12.     TAMAS Company (involved in enrichment-related activities. TAMAS is the overarching body, under which four subsidiaries have been established, including one for uranium extraction to concentration and another in charge of uranium processing, enrichment and waste)


 

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Informational Bulletin distributed by the UN's

Department of Information Regarding Security

Council Resolution 1803 Adopted March 3, 2008

 

 

 

                                                                                   3 March 2008

 

   Security Council         SC/9268   

 

Department of Public Information • News and Media Division • New York

 

 

Security Council

5848th Meeting (PM)

 

SECURITY COUNCIL TIGHTENS RESTRICTIONS ON IRAN’S PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR

 

ACTIVITIES, INCREASES VIGILANCE OVER IRANIAN BANKS, HAS STATES INSPECT CARGO

 

Adopting Resolution 1803 by 14-0-1, Council Welcomes Agreement between Iran,

Atomic Energy Agency to Resolve Outstanding Issues on Iran’s Nuclear Programme

 

The Security Council today approved a new round of sanctions against Iran for refusing to suspend uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related projects, as had been required in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), and for taking issue with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) right to verify design information provided to it.

 

Adopting resolution 1803 (2008) by a vote of 14 in favour to none against, with 1 abstention (Indonesia), the Council, acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter [regarding binding measures not involving armed force], the Council affirmed its earlier decision that Iran should, without delay, suspend the aforementioned activities, as required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (Press Release SC/8928 of 23 December 2006).

 

The Council called upon all States to exercise “vigilance and restraint” regarding entry into or transit through their territories of individuals engaged in or providing support for Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.

 

In that connection, it decided that all States should notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2007) of such entry or transit, specifically of those people mentioned in the annex to resolution 1737, annex I to resolution 1747 (Press Release SC/8980 of 24 March 2007), or annex I and annex II (regarding procurement of prohibited items) of the current resolution, as well of additional persons so designated by the Council or the Committee.

 

The Council further extended the freezing of the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems, including those mentioned in annexes I and II of the current resolution or designated by the Committee.

 

It called upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat.

 

The Council also continued the blocking of the import and export of sensitive nuclear material and equipment, except when meant exclusively for use in light-water reactors with advance notice to the Committee.

 

States were also called upon to inspect cargo to and from Iran of aircraft and vessels owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided “reasonable grounds” existed to believe that the aircraft or vessel was transporting prohibited goods.

 

The Council welcomed the agreement between Iran and IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme, and progress made in that regard, as set out in the Director General’s report of 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4).  In that context, it stressed the willingness of China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States to enhance diplomatic efforts to promote resumption of dialogue with Iran, with a view to seeking long-term solution of the issue that would allow for wider cooperation and, inter alia, the start of direct talks.

 

The Council would suspend the sanctions if and for so long as Iran would suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by IAEA, but warned that, in the event Iran did not comply with relevant Council resolutions, it would decide on the adoption of further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII.

 

At the outset of the meeting, Iran’s representative said: “Today’s action of some members of the Security Council against Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, along with the measures taken in this regard in the past, do not meet the minimum standards of legitimacy and legality.”  Iran’s nuclear programme had been and would remain absolutely peaceful and in no way posed any threat to international peace and security.  It, therefore, did not fall within the Council’s purview.  The peaceful nature of his country’s nuclear programme had been confirmed by each and every IAEA report in the past several years.

 

By resolving the outstanding issues with regard to Iran’s past activities on the one hand, and conducting all its present activities, including the enrichment, under the full and continuous monitoring of the Agency, the country had removed any so-called “concerns” or “ambiguities” with regard to its peaceful nuclear activities in the past and at present, he said.

 

He said the Council’s behaviour in undermining the credibility and integrity of the Agency would only serve the interests of those who preferred to ignore IAEA, such as the Israeli regime, which, with hundreds of nuclear warheads in its possession, posed the most serious threat to international and regional peace and security.  The future security of the world depended on how the United Nations, and especially the Security Council, functioned in a just and impartial manner.  In reality, peoples across the globe had now lost their trust in the Council and considered its actions the result of political pressure exerted by a few Powers to advance their own agendas.

 

Although most Council members said they had voted in favour of the resolution because of Iran’s non-compliance with Council demands, as well as the IAEA stance that it could not guarantee that Iran’s nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes only, Indonesia’s representative, explaining his abstention, said: “Essentially, we are not convinced whether more sanctions, however incremental, well targeted and reversible, would move us forward in resolving the question of Iran’s nuclear programme.”  Conditions today were different than at the adoption of resolution 1747 (2007).   Iran was cooperating with IAEA and, at the present juncture, more sanctions were not the best course.

 

The representative of the United Kingdom read a statement agreed by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States, with support of the High Representative of the European Union, saying that today’s Council action reflected the international community’s ongoing serious concerns about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear programme.  “We deplore Iran’s continued failure to comply with its United Nations Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency Board requirements, in particular by expanding its enrichment-related activities.”

 

Calling upon Iran to heed the requirements of the Council and the Agency, including the suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, he said that the group of countries remained committed to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and reaffirmed their commitment to a dual-track approach.  Proposals presented to Iran in June 2006 offered “substantial opportunities” for political, security and economic benefits to Iran and the region.  He urged Iran to take the opportunity to find a negotiated way forward.

 

The representative of the United States added that the international community had good reason to be concerned about Iran’s activities, as the present regime, armed with nuclear weapons, would pose a greater potential danger to the region and to the world.  Iran had been funding and supporting terrorists and militants in Lebanon, the Palestinian Territory, Iraq and Afghanistan.  The President of Iran had embraced the objective of destroying a Member State of the United Nations.  The ministerial statement showed a commitment to a diplomatic solution.  “It gives us not pleasure, but regret, to have to pass another sanctions resolution.  But our vote today demonstrates that the Council will act when countries violate their international obligations,” he said.

 

The representatives of South Africa, Libya, Viet Nam, France, China, Costa Rica, Burkina Faso, Belgium, Panama, Croatia and the Russian Federation also made statements.

 

The meeting was called to order at 12:45 p.m. and adjourned at 2:55 p.m.

 

Background

 

The Security Council met this afternoon to take action on a draft resolution regarding non-proliferation contained in document S/2008/141, sponsored by France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

 

It also had before it a letter dated 22 February from the Permanent Representative of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General and the Council President (document S/2008/116).  In it, the Ambassador writes that the latest report of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General of 22 February (GOV/2008/4) declares the full implementation of the work plan concluded between Iran and IAEA in August 2007 (INFCIRC/711) and, thus, resolution and closure of all outstanding issues.  The Director General had stressed that “the Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided by Iran, in accordance with the work plan, are consistent with its findings” and “considers those questions no longer outstanding”.  The report also clearly attests to the “exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme”, both in the past and at present.

 

He writes that the consideration of Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme was imposed on the Council by certain countries out of “mere political motivations and narrow national interests and on the basis of certain pretexts and allegations, which have been totally baseless”.  The full implementation of the work plan has eliminated those pretexts and allegations.  The current and other reports show that Iran is committed to its international obligations and, at the same time, persistent in pursuing and exercising its legal and inalienable rights.

 

He further states in his letter that, according to the IAEA report, the Agency had recently received from Iran additional information similar to that which Iran had previously provided, pursuant to the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as updated design information.  Iran had provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and had provided relevant reports.  It had also provided access to individuals in response to the Agency’s requests.

 

It had now become clear, says Iran’s Permanent Representative, that the country’s peaceful nuclear issue should be dealt with by the Agency as the sole pertinent international organization and that safeguards implementation in Iran had to be “in a routine manner from now on”.  Further, “the Security Council should avoid inflicting more damage to the credibility and authority of IAEA, as well as its own credibility, by persisting in further illegal and illogical engagement and actions pursued by few countries,” he writes.

 

Draft Resolution

 

The full text of the draft resolution (document S/2008/141) reads as follows:

 

The Security Council,

 

Recalling the statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29 March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006 and its resolution 1747 (2007) of 24 March 2007, and reaffirming their provisions,

 

Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

 

Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors (GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery,

 

Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of 23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/22), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/48) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4) of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and heavy-water-related projects as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) and which are essential to build confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,

 

Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, emphasizing that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the Agency’s right to verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility,

 

Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors, commending the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme in the work plan between the Secretariat of the IAEA and Iran (GOV/2007/48, Attachment), welcoming the progress in implementation of this work plan as reflected in the IAEA Director General’s report of 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), underlining the importance of Iran producing tangible results rapidly and effectively by completing implementation of this work plan including by providing answers to all the questions the IAEA asks so that the Agency, through the implementation of the required transparency measures, can assess the completeness and correctness of Iran’s declaration,

 

Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution, that guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,

 

Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June 2006 proposals (S/2006/521), and noting the confirmation by these countries that once the confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is restored it will be treated in the same manner as that of any Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

 

Having regard to States’ rights and obligations relating to international trade,

 

Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Actions Task Force (FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial obligations under resolution 1737 (2006),

 

Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and with the requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

 

Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

 

Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

 

“1.   Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006), and underlines that the IAEA has sought confirmation that Iran will apply Code 3.1 modified;

 

“2.   Welcomes the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and progress made in this regard as set out in the Director General’s report of 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), encourages the IAEA to continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues, stresses that this would help to re-establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and supports the IAEA in strengthening its safeguards on Iran’s nuclear activities in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA;

 

“3.   Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein “the Committee”) of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006), Annex I to resolution 1747 (2007) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3(b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006);

 

“4.   Underlines that nothing in paragraph 3 above requires a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take into account humanitarian considerations, including religious obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) and resolution 1747 (2007), including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

 

“5.   Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated in Annex II to this resolution as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006) and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

 

“6.   Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 above shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of the present resolution;

 

“7.   Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons and entities listed in Annexes I and III to this resolution, and any persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and to entities owned or controlled by them and to persons and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in violating the provisions of, this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

 

“8.   Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of:

 

(a)   all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006), of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in sections 1 and 2 of the Annex to that document, and sections 3 to 6 as notified in advance to the Committee, only when for exclusive use in light water reactors, and where such supply, sale or transfer is necessary for technical cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices as provided for in paragraph 16 of resolution 1737 (2006);

 

(b)   all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set out in 19.A.3 of Category II of document S/2006/815;

 

“9.   Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade, in order to avoid such financial support contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

 

“10.  Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order to avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

 

“11.  Calls upon all States, in accordance with their national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international civil aviation agreements, to inspectthe cargoes to and from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

 

“12.  Requires all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in the paragraph above is undertaken, to submit to the Security Council within five working days a written report on the inspection containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, as well as information on its time, place, circumstances, results and other relevant details;

 

“13.  Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above;

 

“14.  Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the measures imposed in resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution;

 

“15.  Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote resumption of dialogue, and consultations on the basis of their offer to Iran, with a view to seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this issue which would allow for the development of all-round relations and wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and inter alia, starting direct talks and negotiation with Iran as long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA;

 

“16.  Encourages the European Union High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy to continue communication with Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution including relevant proposals by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks;

 

“17.  Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran, taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented by reason of the measures imposed by the present resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

 

“18.  Requests within 90 days a further report from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and of this resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration;

 

“19.  Reaffirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of the report referred to in the paragraph above, and:

 

(a)   that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, as verified by the IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an early and mutually acceptable outcome;

 

(b)   that it shall terminate the measures specified in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), and in paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above, as soon as it determines, following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above, that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

 

(c)   that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran has not complied with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary;

 

“20.  Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

 

Resolution Annex I

 

1.    Amir Moayyed Alai (involved in managing the assembly and engineering of centrifuges)

2.    Mohammad Fedai Ashiani (involved in the production of ammonium uranyl carbonate and management of the Natanz enrichment complex)

3.    Abbas Rezaee Ashtiani (a senior official at the AEOI Office of Exploration and Mining Affairs)

4.    Haleh Bakhtiar (involved in the production of magnesium at a concentration of 99.9%)

5.    Morteza Behzad (involved in making centrifuge components)

6.    Dr. Mohammad Eslami (Head of Defence Industries Training and Research Institute)

7.    Seyyed Hussein Hosseini (AEOI official involved in the heavy water research reactor project at Arak)

8.    M. Javad Karimi Sabet (Head of Novin Energy Company, which is designated under resolution 1747 (2007))

9.    Hamid-Reza Mohajerani (involved in production management at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan)

10.   Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi (former Deputy Chief of Armed Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research/Head of State Anti-Smuggling Headquarters, engaged in efforts to get round the sanctions imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007))

11.   Houshang Nobari (involved in the management of the Natanz enrichment complex)

12.   Abbas Rashidi (involved in enrichment work at Natanz)

13.   Ghasem Soleymani (Director of Uranium Mining Operations at the Saghand Uranium Mine)

 

Resolution Annex II

 

A.    Individuals listed in resolution 1737 (2006)

 

1.    Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development

2.    Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)

3.    Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager ( Arak)

 

B.    Individuals listed in resolution 1747 (2007)

 

1.    Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)

2.    Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Production Centre, which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in enrichment-related activities)

 

Resolution Annex III

 

1.    Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (BK Co.) (involved in the production of centrifuge components)

2.    Barzagani Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies (subsidiary of Saccal System companies) (this company tried to purchase sensitive goods for an entity listed in resolution 1737 (2006))

3.    Electro Sanam Company (E. S. Co./E. X. Co.) (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)

4.    Ettehad Technical Group (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)

5.    Industrial Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery (aka Instrumentation Factories Plant) (used by AIO for some acquisition attempts)

6.    Jabber Ibn Hayan (AEOI laboratory involved in fuel-cycle activities)

7.    Joza Industrial Co. (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)

8.    Khorasan Metallurgy Industries (subsidiary of the Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG) which depends on DIO. Involved in the production of centrifuges components)

9.    Niru Battery Manufacturing Company (subsidiary of the DIO. Its role is to manufacture power units for the Iranian military including missile systems)

10.   Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries (has participated in construction of the Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan) 

11.   Safety Equipment Procurement (SEP) (AIO front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)

12.   TAMAS Company (involved in enrichment-related activities. TAMAS is the overarching body, under which four subsidiaries have been established, including one for uranium extraction to concentration and another in charge of uranium processing, enrichment and waste)

 

Statements

 

MOHAMMAD KHAZAEE ( Iran) said: “Today’s action of some members of the Security Council against Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, along with the measures taken in this regard in the past, do not meet the minimum standards of legitimacy and legality.”   Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme had been brought to the Council in violation of the [International Atomic Energy Agency’s] statute; Iran had not violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.  It had signed the Additional Protocol in 2003 and had begun its voluntary implementation, which it was not supposed to have begun implementing prior to 2003.  In addition, Iran was only obliged to inform IAEA 180 days prior to feeding nuclear material into facilities, but it had informed the Agency about the uranium conversion facility four years prior to its operation in 2004, and also four years before Iran had been obliged to do so.

 

He said Iran’s nuclear programme had been, and would remain, absolutely peaceful, and in no way posed any threat to international peace and security.  It, therefore, did not fall within the Council’s purview.  The peaceful nature of his country’s nuclear programme had been confirmed by each and every IAEA report in the past several years.  On the basis of ideological and strategic grounds, Iran categorically rejected the development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, as well as of all other weapons of mass destruction, and it was a leader in international efforts to oppose such weapons.  The IAEA Director General had stressed in various statements that “the Agency does not have any data or evidence indicating that Iran is trying to develop nuclear weapons” and that there was “no evidence Iran’s enrichment of uranium is intended for a military nuclear programme”.

 

The outstanding issues were now resolved and closed, he stressed.  The co-sponsors of today’s resolution had argued in the past that the Council should be involved due to unresolved outstanding questions.  However, Iran had concluded a work plan with IAEA in August 2007 to address and resolve the outstanding issues.  The conclusion of the work plan had been described as “a significant step forward” by the Director General.  The co-sponsors of today’s resolution had spared no efforts to hamper its successful implementation.  The Agency’s 22 February report, however, had “clearly declared the resolution and closure of all outstanding issues”.  The Director General had said after the report’s release, “we managed to clarify all the remaining outstanding issues, including the most important issue, which is the scope and nature of Iran’s enrichment programme”.

 

By resolving the outstanding issues with regard to Iran’s past activities on the one hand, and conducting all its present activities, including the enrichment, under the full and continuous monitoring of IAEA, the country had removed any so-called “concerns” or “ambiguities” with regard to its peaceful nuclear activities in the past and at present, Mr. Khazaee said.   Those who had resorted to a systematic and relentless campaign of false claims, propaganda, intimidation and pressure aimed at IAEA had prompted one of its senior officials to stress that “since 2002, pretty much all the intelligence that’s come to us [from the United States] has proved to be wrong”.  A well-organized and pre-planned propaganda campaign had begun even before the release of the latest IAEA report, in order to eclipse Iran’s resolving outstanding issues.

 

He said the full implementation of the work plan, and thus resolution and closure of the outstanding issues, had eliminated the most basic pretexts and allegations, on the basis of which Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme had been referred to the Council.  “ Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme should be dealt with solely by the Agency.”

 

Addressing the suspension issue, he said that Iran could not and would not accept a requirement that was legally defective and politically coercive.  Neither in the IAEA’s statute, nor in the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s safeguards, not even in the Additional Protocol, were “enrichment” and “reprocessing” prohibited.  There was not even a limit for the level of enrichment.  Voluntary suspension had been in place for more than two years in Iran and that had been verified.  It had become clear, however, that those insisting on suspension had indeed aimed to prolong and ultimately perpetuate it, and thus deprive Iran from exercising its inalienable rights.  The attempt to make the suspension mandatory through the Council, from the outset, had violated the fundamental principles of international law, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA Board of Governors’ resolutions.

 

He said the Council’s decision to coerce Iran into suspension had also been a gross violation of the United Nations Charter’s Article 25.  The Council could not coerce countries into submitting either to its decisions taken in bad faith or to its demands negating the fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter.   Iran needed to enrich uranium to provide fuel for the nuclear reactors it was planning to build to meet the growing energy needs.  There had never been guarantees that those fuel needs would be provided fully by foreign sources.  No country could solely rely on others to provide it with the technology and materials that were vital for its development and for the welfare of its people.

 

As a representative of a founding Member of the United Nations, he expressed “grave concern and dismay regarding the path that the Security Council has chosen and pursued”.  The Council should be a secure and safe place where the rights of nations, not only were not violated, but were fully respected.  A question arose as to why, after all the crimes of the Zionist regime in the Occupied Palestinian Territory had had been described as ethnic cleansing, genocide and war crimes by the international community, the Council had failed to put an end to those crimes.  Recalling the Council’s inaction after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980, he said “no amount of explanation would be able to describe the disastrous consequences of these unacceptable behaviours of the Security Council”.

 

The Council’s behaviour in undermining the credibility and integrity of IAEA would only serve the interests of those who preferred to ignore the Agency, such as the Israeli regime, which, with hundreds of nuclear warheads in its possession, posed the most serious threat to international and regional peace and security.  “Is it not time for the Council to respect the judgement of an institution that is part of the UN system?  Or to respect the legitimate rights of a great nation with a long history of civilization and peaceful coexistence with other nations?” he asked.  The future security of the world depended on how the United Nations, and especially the Security Council, functioned in a just and impartial manner.  In reality, peoples across the globe had now lost their trust in the Council and considered its actions the result of political pressure exerted by a few Powers to advance their own agendas.

 

DUMISANI S. KUMALO ( South Africa) regretted that the sponsors of the resolution persisted with the same text they had tabled before the IAEA Director General’s report.  The resolution appeared not to adequately take into account the progress that had been made between Iran and the Agency.  Adoption of the new resolution could not even be postponed until the IAEA Board had had a full opportunity to consider the matter.  That left the impression that the verification work and progress made by the Agency was virtually irrelevant to the co-sponsors.

 

He said the rationale to bring the issue to the Council was to reinforce the decisions of the Agency and enhance its authority, yet the resolution did not accurately reflect what was happening at the Agency.  He was seriously concerned about the implications of that for the Security Council’s credibility, and the only reason South Africa supported the resolution was to preserve the unanimity behind previous Council decisions.

 

IAEA was the only international authority that could provide necessary assurances as to the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, he said.  It was unfortunate that the Council gave the impression that it was in such haste to decide on further punitive sanctions that it did not wish to consider the progress being made through IAEA to provide factual information on implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s safeguards in Iran.  The Director General’s report clearly showed that all outstanding safeguard issues had been clarified and the Agency had not found evidence of diversion.

 

Since the adoption of resolution 1747 (2007) and following the release of the United States national intelligence estimate, the situation had changed, he said.  Since all outstanding issues had been clarified, there should be increased confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.  At the same time, the need for continued factual information about Iran’s current nuclear activities could be said to be more important in the context of the recent allegations of weaponization activities.

 

Also important, he noted, was not to jeopardize any of the gains made, and the Council should seek to build on progress made through the continued verification of the Agency’s work.  Given the “confidence deficit” that existed, he urged moving forward in a responsible manner.

 

South Africa did not wish to see a nuclear-weaponsized Iran or the denial of the right of any signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to exploit the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, he said.  Nor did South Africa want to see a war break out over the nuclear programme in Iran.  Additionally, the suspension of enrichment activities should not become a goal in itself.  The Council should assure Iran that the call for suspension was not a smokescreen for any indefinite suspension or termination.

 

He said it was also important to terminate the sanctions once IAEA had addressed the remaining issues.  In addition, the restrictions on dual-use goods and on loans and credits must not be allowed to have a negative impact on the civilian population of Iran.  Security Council members that voted in favour of the resolution, including South Africa, had a special obligation to the Iranian people and must exercise the highest degree of oversight in the implementation of the sanctions to ensure no unintended consequences.

 

IBRAHIM O. A. DABBASHI ( Libya) said his country attached great importance to nuclear non-proliferation and it was not continuing in its programme.  The only guarantee of the non-use of weapons of mass destruction was their elimination.  In that context, he favoured nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world, including the Middle East, and had supported resolutions in that regard, including in the context of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, including in 2007.  Non-proliferation and disarmament were comprehensive issues and should be applied without discrimination.

 

He said the Council had not attached appropriate importance to Israeli nuclear weapons, despite the fact that Israel had refused to take part in the Non-Proliferation Treaty or comply with the IAEA safeguards regime.   Israel had not taken into consideration the repeated appeals against nuclear weapons, which could have “terrible effects” in the region.   Israel’s attitude, and the massacres it was committing in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, showed that the regime was “terrorist and irresponsible”.  It did not take into consideration international law or international codes of conduct.  It was vital for the Council to deal with that subject comprehensively, and for all countries to become party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

 

While stressing the importance of nuclear non-proliferation, he also reaffirmed the right of States parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  The report of the IAEA Director General of 22 February showed that essential progress had been made on the Iranian nuclear file and most outstanding issues had been resolved.  The draft resolution should have taken those positive developments into consideration.

 

However, he said, given the fact that countries that had developed the text had taken into account the concerns of other members and that most believed it was appropriate to adopt the resolution, despite the fact that his delegation did not agree with the assessment process, Libya associated itself with the Council’s consensus and would support the resolution, so as to promote one Council viewpoint.

 

LE LUONG MINH ( Viet Nam) said his country attached great importance to all three major pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- non-proliferation, respect for the rights of all the parties to develop, research and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and nuclear disarmament.  Viet Nam had proposed changes to the draft resolution to the effect that Iran’s cooperation with IAEA and other progress, as well as the authority and role of the Agency as the body mandated to resolve the non-proliferation issues within the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s framework would be more adequately reflected.  With the proposed changes having been incorporated, the fact that IAEA had indicated that Iran still needed to respond to requests by it and by the Council, as well as the fact that the scope of implementation envisaged in the draft was basically the same as in the previous resolutions adopted by consensus, Viet Nam would vote in favour of it.

 

He said favourable conditions must be created, however, for the peaceful solution of the Iran nuclear issue, including cessation of hostile policies against Iran, assurance of Iran’s legitimate security interests and respect for the right of Iran to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the adherence by all States in the region to the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be positive steps in that direction.  While hailing new progress in cooperation between Iran and IAEA, he hoped that Iran’s efforts would be positively matched in the coming period.

 

MARTY M. NATALEGAWA ( Indonesia) underscored the imperative to find a peaceful solution to any question related to nuclear non-proliferation, one that was guided by the need to protect the integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.   Indonesia had full confidence in IAEA’s credibility and had been guided by its latest report in determining the right course of action.  He appreciated Iran’s efforts for greater cooperation, which had allowed the Agency to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material.   Iran had provided IAEA with access to declared nuclear material, as well as required nuclear material accountancy reports in that connection.

 

He noted that the Agency had considered that all remaining outstanding issues contained in the work plan, with the exception of one, had been resolved.  The report stated that Iran had not suspended its enrichment-related activities, had begun developing new generation centrifuges and had continued its construction of the IR-40 reactor of heavy water production.  For the remaining one issue, namely alleged weaponization studies, the report noted that the Agency had not detected the use of nuclear material.  However, it also stated that it was “not yet in a position to determine the full nature of Iran’s nuclear programme”.  It was important to note that progress had been made in resolving the outstanding issues.

 

Noting the “well-calibrated nature” of the report, which depicted well the complexity of the issue, he said that Indonesia had expected that the draft resolution would reflect those complex dynamics and mixed findings.  In that context, he noted that the additional sanctions had been described as “incremental” and that the Council would suspend implementation if Iran curtailed all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

 

“Essentially, we are not convinced whether more sanctions, however incremental, well targeted and reversible, would move us forward in resolving the question of Iran’s nuclear programme,” he said, wondering whether more sanctions at this juncture constituted “the most sensible approach”.  Instead, he believed the lack of confidence and trust was at the heart of the matter.

 

He said he expected Iran to continue to engage actively with the Agency to build confidence about its programme.  The Iran dossier was referred to the Council to encourage the country to resolve outstanding verification issues, and while work was ongoing, progress had been made.  Suspension of enrichment-related activities was not an end in itself, isolated from developments in Iran’s cooperation with IAEA.

 

There was often a vicious cycle, with no guarantee given to non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the security of supply of nuclear technology and materials for peaceful purposes; they were prone to suspicion, he said.  To end that cycle, it was imperative to move forward in a constructive manner and renew the initiative to establish a multilateral arrangement to guarantee the security of supply of nuclear technology and material.  That would provide assurance to Iran and end existing suspicions.  The Non-Proliferation Treaty should be pursued in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner.

 

It was important to recognize that conditions today were different than on the eve of adoption of resolution 1747 (2007), he said.   Iran was cooperating with IAEA and, at the present juncture, more sanctions were not the best course.  For that reason, Indonesia would abstain in today’s vote.

 

Action

 

The Council then voted on the draft resolution, which was adopted by a vote of 14 in favour to none against, with 1 abstention ( Indonesia) as resolution 1803 (2008).

 

Statements

 

JOHN SAWERS (United Kingdom), reading a statement agreed by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States, with support of the High Representative of the European Union, said that the Security Council today adopted resolution 1803 (2008) reflecting the international community’s ongoing serious concerns about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear programme.  It was the third time the Council had sent a strong message of international resolve to Iran by adopting a sanctions resolution under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter.  “We deplore Iran’s continued failure to comply with its United Nations Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board requirements, in particular by expanding its enrichment-related activities,” he said.

 

He noted progress made in implementing the IAEA-Iran work plan, but also the Agency’s serious concerns about the “alleged studies”, which were critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension to the country’s nuclear programme.  He called upon Iran to heed the requirements of the Council and the Agency, including the suspension of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

 

He said he remained committed to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue, and reaffirmed the countries’ commitment to a dual-track approach.  Proposals presented to Iran in June 2006 offered “substantial opportunities” for political, security and economic benefits to Iran and the region, and he urged Iran to take the opportunity to find a negotiated way forward.

 

Reiterating the countries’ recognition of Iran’s right to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, he reconfirmed that, once the international community’s confidence in the “exclusively peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear programme was restored, Iran would be treated in the same manner as any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

 

He said the countries remained ready to negotiate future arrangements, modalities and timing in that respect, once the conditions had been established.  As that would require further diplomatic efforts, the European Union’s High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, had been asked to meet with Saeed Jalili, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, to address concerns of both sides.

 

Speaking in his national capacity, he said his Government welcomed the “very broad support” for the Council’s resolution.  Its adoption underlined the global community’s profound concern that Iran might be intending to use its nuclear programme for military purposes.  “The United Kingdom does not have confidence that Iran’s programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,” he said.

 

The resolution was a necessary response to Iran’s failure to comply with IAEA Board requirements, including suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activity and work on all heavy-water-related projects, resolution of all outstanding questions and implementation and ratification of the Additional Protocol. Iran’s progress with IAEA addressed only one of those issues.   Iran had refused to answer the most difficult questions about its past programmes.  Overall, Iran had clearly failed to abide by its legal obligations under successive Security Council resolutions.

 

The political statement agreed by the Foreign Ministers of the “E3+3”, with support of the European Union High Representative, had made clear the commitment to a negotiated solution on the basis of far-reaching proposals to which the six countries had agreed in June 2006, he said.  “Our offer would give Iran everything it needs to develop a modern civil nuclear power programme, including legally guaranteed supplies of nuclear fuel.”  He regretted that Iran had ignored the offer. Iran’s failure to do what was required, as stated by IAEA, had left no other option but to seek further measures in the Council.

 

He said those measures strengthened restrictions on individuals and entities associated with Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and ballistic missile programme, increased vigilance over the activities of Iranian banks, introduced a provision for careful scrutiny of new commitments for export credits to Iran and encouraged States to inspect cargo to and from Iran.  By adopting the text, the Council had continued its “incremental and proportionate approach”.  His Government urged Iran’s leaders to suspend its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and cooperate fully with IAEA.  With the new resolution, the Council was reaffirming the clear choice confronting Iran’s leaders: to cooperate with the global community or pursue their nuclear programme in disregard of international concerns.  He hoped they would take the positive path.

 

JEAN-PIERRE LACROIX ( France) saluted the almost unanimous adoption of the resolution as a clear and firm message.  The Non-Proliferation Treaty had established a regime based on trust and confidence.   Iran had concealed an underground nuclear programme.  While enrichment was going on, Iran was working on techniques that could be used to develop nuclear weapons.  Iran was also actively developing long-range missiles.  Given that situation, the international community’s request to restore confidence was understandable.  Iran must suspend proliferation-sensitive activities and cooperate with IAEA.  That was not a matter of refusing Iran the right to develop nuclear energy.  The Director General had concluded that IAEA could not take a stand on the nature and scope of Iran’s nuclear programme.

 

He said there was no choice but to adopt sanctions against the country.  Describing the measures in the current resolution, he said the approach was not punitive.  The priority was to find a diplomatic solution.  The Council would suspend the measures as soon as Iran fully respected its obligations.   Iran had been offered a proposal for cooperation dealing with political, economic and nuclear cooperation, as a way of extending a hand to the Iranian people.  He hoped that proposal would be accepted.

 

ZALMAY KHALILZAD ( United States) said that, instead of suspending its enrichment and reprocessing activities, as required by the Council, Iran had chosen to dramatically expand its number of operating centrifuges and to develop and test a new generation of centrifuges.  It continued the construction of its heavy-water research reactor at Arak and it still had not implemented the Additional Protocol.  Once again, the Council had had no choice but to act.  “At stake is the security of a vital region of the world and the credibility of the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency as they seek to hold Iran to its nuclear non-proliferation commitments.”  The latest IAEA report had stated that Iran had not met its obligation to fully disclose its past nuclear weapons programme.

 

He said that, on the core issue of whether Iran’s nuclear programme was strictly peaceful, the report had not shown serious progress.  IAEA had presented Iran with documents detailing Iran’s efforts to develop a nuclear warhead and other possible undeclared activities with nuclear material.   Iran had dismissed those documents as “baseless and fabricated”.  IAEA, however, did not share that conclusion.  “Instead of slogans and obfuscations, the international community needs answers from Iran.”  The international community must be able to believe Iran’s declaration that its nuclear programme was for exclusively peaceful purposes.

 

Iranian leaders, as a first step, must cease enrichment and reprocessing activities and make a full disclosure of all of its weapons-related work, he said.  Iran had not fully implemented the Additional Protocol, which IAEA required in order to determine what other undeclared nuclear activities were taking place.  He asked, in that regard, why Iranian leaders were not fully implementing the additional safeguards and what it was hiding.  If Iran wanted the world to believe that its nuclear programme was peaceful, that programme must be transparent with IAEA inspectors and Iran must implement the Additional Protocol, as repeatedly called for by the Council and IAEA.

 

He said the United States recognized Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  The five permanent members of the Council and Germany had offered to help Iran develop civil nuclear power, and the Russian Federation had supplied fuel for Iran’s nuclear power plan in Bushehr.  That had exposed Iran’s false claim that it needed to enrich uranium for civil nuclear power.  Seventeen countries generating nuclear power purchased their fuel on the international market, rather than enrich uranium themselves.  Iran should follow the example of other States that had abandoned nuclear weapons programmes, two of them now sitting on the Council, namely South Africa and Libya.

 

The international community had good reason to be concerned about Iran’s activities, as the present regime armed with nuclear weapons would pose a greater potential danger to the region and to the world, he warned.  Iran had been funding and supporting terrorists and militants in Lebanon, the Palestinian Territory, Iraq and Afghanistan.  The President of Iran had embraced the objective of destroying a Member State of the United Nations.  The ministerial statement agreed to by the “P5+1” showed a commitment to a diplomatic solution.  “It gives us not pleasure, but regret, to have to pass another sanctions resolution.  But our vote today demonstrates that the Council will act when countries violate their international obligations.”  He hoped Iran would engage in constructive negotiations over the future of its nuclear programme.  Such negotiations, if successful, would have profound benefits for Iran and the Iranian people.

 

WANG GUANGYA ( China) said today’s resolution was the Security Council’s fourth on the Iranian nuclear issue since July 2006.  It reflected international concern at, and expectations of all parties regarding an early settlement through diplomatic negotiations of, the Iranian nuclear issue.  Developments vis-à-vis the Iranian issue had been mixed.  On one hand, the Director General’s latest report suggested that the Agency could verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran and had no concrete information about possible undeclared nuclear material and activities.   Iran had clarified such outstanding issues as uranium contamination and polonium experiments, and had provided information similar to that which it had provided previously, pursuant to the Additional Protocol.

 

He said his country welcomed the cooperation between Iran and IAEA, but the report had also stated that Iran had not suspended its enrichment activities, as required by Security Council resolutions, and it had started development of centrifuges.  As the impasse had not been broken, the international community was calling for more diplomatic efforts, and hoped that parties could bring the issue back on the track of settlement.

 

Against that backdrop, the Council’s resolution was not aimed at punishing Iran; rather urging its return to the negotiating table, he said. The sanctions were not targeted at the Iranian people, and would not affect Iran’s normal economic and financial activities with other countries. Indeed, the measures were reversible: if Iran complied with the Security Council and IAEA resolutions, the sanctions would be suspended or terminated.

 

He reiterated that sanctions could not resolve issues; they could only promote negotiations.  Indeed, the best approach was through diplomatic negotiating.  All parties should adopt a highly responsible attitude, and he further urged flexibility and sincerity in resuming talks.  Efforts to seek a solution should assure Iran’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to address international nuclear non-proliferation concerns.   Iran should fully comply with IAEA and Security Council resolutions, as soon as possible.

 

Noting that the six Foreign Ministers had expressed their readiness to increase diplomatic efforts to vigorously facilitate the resumption of negotiations, he said China hoped that all would engage in closer contact on the basis of mutual respect, including for each others’ concerns, and increased mutual trust, and seek an approach that was acceptable to all.  His Government was ready to work with all parties to settle the Iranian nuclear issue.

 

JORGE URBINA ORTEGA ( Costa Rica) said he could not accept that the representative of Iran had stated that the Council had acted on the instigation of some countries.  There were still areas of non-compliance by Iran with Council resolutions.

 

The strategic approach to preventing proliferation was based on the willingness of States that lacked nuclear weapons not to acquire them, and the decision of the nuclear-weapon States to gradually reduce their arsenals, he said.  However, some countries that were not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had developed nuclear weapons programmes with total impunity.  Real progress in disarmament required that, not only horizontal proliferation had to be stopped, but also vertical proliferation, meaning that the continuous development of new technologies should also be halted.

 

He could not endorse the behaviour of some States that demanded that others comply with their obligations stemming from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, while disregarding some of their own responsibilities.  There was very little incentive for non-proliferation in an international environment in which there was feeble progress in disarmament and weak guarantees that the existing nuclear weapons would not be utilized.

 

There was a need for a transparent, sustainable and credible plan for multilateral nuclear disarmament and to create a virtuous circle where progress in disarmament and non-proliferation could mutually reinforce one another, he said.  His country respected the right of every State to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but considered that right to be contingent on the fulfilment of all international obligations on the matter.  The right to enrich uranium was a legitimate activity if its scope and objectives were subjected to complete international supervision through absolutely transparent processes.  “We believe this is still not the case of the Iranian nuclear programme, and for this reason, we are obligated to support the resolution that we are voting on today,” he said.

 

The situation in Gaza was a different matter, he said.  He expressed concern at the humanitarian situation in the region and had condemned attacks on Israel.  His country had also criticized non-action by the Council.

 

MICHEL KAFANDO ( Burkina Faso) said his country, since the start of consideration of the Iranian question, had registered its reservations about considering a resolution prior to the issuance of the IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear programme, as it recognized any country’s right to achieve nuclear energy for civilian purposes.  Burkina Faso had examined the IAEA report and noted the absence of full cooperation on the part of Iran, as well as the fact that IAEA could not determine the exact nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

 

He stressed that all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must fully disclose their information, and that view was further supported by the report’s description of uranium enrichment activities and the development of new centrifuges.  He had also noted the report’s statement on the refusal of Iran to implement the Additional Protocol.  For those reasons -- and to encourage Iran’s full cooperation with IAEA, notably by providing specific information on its nuclear programme -– Burkina Faso had voted in favour of the resolution.

 

The objective of the additional measures was not to choke Iran or to create prejudice; it was simply to encourage Iran’s cooperation with the Agency and the transparency of its programme, he explained.  He urged that dialogue continue to persuade Iran that it was in its interest to subscribe to the safeguards system.  In that spirit, he approved the statement made by the Foreign Ministers of the six countries, which expressed a desire for increased dialogue with Iran.  He was convinced that, only through negotiations would the Iranian issue be resolved.

 

JOHAN VERBEKE ( Belgium) said he had voted in favour of the resolution and welcomed its adoption by a large majority.  He regretted that Iran was still not in compliance with Council resolutions aimed at suspension of uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related projects.  The 22 February IAEA report had concluded that the Director General was not in a position to provide guarantees regarding non-declared material and the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.  The new resolution was part of a gradual approach aimed at urging Iranian authorities to adopt a more cooperative and transparent position.  The resolution also made clear that the path of good faith negotiations remained open to Iran.

 

ALFREDO SUESCUM ( Panama) said he regretted that, once again, sanctions had to be imposed on Iran.  The necessity of applying coercive measures reflected a failure of diplomacy on the part of all parties.  As a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran must adhere to restrictions related to development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, but had the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including enrichment.  That right, however, involved important obligations, including the open and transparent inspection by IAEA.

 

He said that, according to its last report, IAEA could not provide guarantees on the absence of non-declared materials and was still not in a position to determine the nature of the uranium-enrichment programme.  Until there was clarity on the current scope of the nuclear programme, Iran had not fully complied with its obligations.  Although the Council had required that Iran suspend enrichment activities, it had not done so, according to the IAEA report, and, therefore, was not complying with Council resolutions.  For those reasons, Panama had voted in favour of the resolution, but hoped that the situation could be solved promptly.

 

NEVEN JURICA ( Croatia) said his country, as an active member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA Board, attached importance to the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and fully shared the concerns of the wider international community.  Every State had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but it was also important to abide by international obligations.  While the report’s findings were satisfactory, they did not paint an overall positive picture, as they pointed to Iran’s avoidance of key questions.   Iran’s failure to provide a clear response left questions about the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

 

He noted that IAEA had also pointed to possible military dimensions to the programme and to provisions of resolution 1747 (2007) that had not been implemented.  Further, Iran had not suspended its enrichment-related activities.  In light of that, Croatia had voted in favour of the resolution.  Following that, his Government welcomed the commitment of the six Foreign Ministers to continue with all diplomatic efforts to resolve the issues.

 

Council President VITALY I. CHURKIN (Russian Federation), speaking in his national capacity, said his Government had supported the resolution and was pleased that the work of the six Foreign Ministers had brought the Council to a text that was balanced and met the tasks at hand.  Indeed, the resolution was a political signal to Iran on the need for cooperation, on the basis of implementing recommendations.  It was important for the six countries now to develop proposals for further talks, from which Iran and the region could benefit.  The Council recognized Iran’s rights under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.  Once confidence was restored, Iran would be treated in the same manner as any other Treaty party.

 

He said today’s decision, similar to those in resolutions 1747 (2007) and 1737 (2006), was taken under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter and called for no use of force whatsoever.  Effective solution of the problem could be found only in the political and diplomatic sphere.  His Government favoured a “fresh approach” and was prepared to facilitate talks to settle pending issues.  Hopefully, Iran would analyse today’s statements and choose to meet the requirements of both the Council and IAEA, and help to launch negotiations.  The six countries must also be willing to engage in constructive cooperation with Iran.

 

* *** *


For information media • not an official record

 

 

 

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Tehran to IAEA:

 

Iran will one day seek reparations

 

Tehran Times Political Desk

March 5, 2008

 

 

VIENNA -- Ali Asghar Soltanieh, the permanent representative of the Islamic
Republic of Iran to the International Atomic Energy Agency, delivered a speech
about
Iran’s peaceful nuclear program before the IAEA Board of Governors in
Vienna on Wednesday.


Soltanieh told the board members: “Be sure that the day will come when we request compensation for all these damages inflicted on Iran and its peoples through these unsubstantiated allegations and unlawful actions elsewhere.”

Following is the full text of his speech: “Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates,

At the outset, I would like to express the sincere appreciation of my Government for the valuable support of the Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement and associate myself to the positions declared by the distinguished Ambassador of Cuba in her capacity as the Chairperson of the NAM.

Mr. Chairman,

Once again this august body is considering Iranian peaceful nuclear issue at this important juncture whereas the new report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has officially declared that all outstanding issues regarding the nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran have been resolved in accordance with the agreed work plan. The report has reconfirmed for the eleventh time that there has been no diversion to military and prohibited purposes in the peaceful nuclear activities and materials in Iran. As reflected in the Director General’s report where he refers to his visit to Iran: “the Iranian leadership stated that the country’s nuclear program had always been exclusively for peaceful purposes and that there had never been a nuclear weapons development program.”

Iran has constantly based its nuclear policy on cooperation with the IAEA which proved that all disinformation and negative propaganda about Iran’s nuclear program and activities are nothing but short-sighted and narrowly defined interests of a few.

Let us have a quick look at the background of Iranian peaceful nuclear issue since 2003 when it was imposed on the agenda of the Board by a few Member States who had a hidden political agenda of depriving Iranian nation having access to the nuclear energy for the peaceful purposes.

 

There were different pretexts, at that time, under the cover of ambiguities to portray Iranian nuclear program as an issue of proliferation concern. The Members of the Agency recall very well that once a certain country and its partners were exaggerating the issue of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) particles as a smoking gun for a nuclear weapon program in Iran. Through Iran's proactive cooperation the Agency confirmed that the origin of HEU is from outside of Iran and not as a result of enrichment activities in Iran. After the conclusion of the HEU issue, it was supposed to remove Iran’s nuclear issue from the agenda of the Board. But, those countries with political motivations turned their focus on another allegation, the past plutonium experiments, and in November 2004 the US Ambassador in this body called this issue a strong indication of “Iran’s plutonium nuclear weapon program.” Afterward, at the eve of each meeting of the Board when the Director General was about to report progress, the other issues and baseless accusations one by one have arisen in the Board to the extent that even they requested visits of highly sensitive military sites and asking to take samples. On all these occasions Iran did its utmost to cooperate with the Agency in order to remove the pretexts and answer the questions although most of them were beyond Iran’s obligations. Then what was the result? In all cases the statements of Iran were consistent with the Agency’s findings, thus proving allegations to be wrong.

Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues

In August 2007, the Islamic Republic of Iran took an initiative to resolve the remaining outstanding issues in order to remove any ambiguities about the past and the present of its peaceful nuclear activities once and for all. In this respect a work plan was agreed between the Agency and Iran. On the basis of the work plan, an exhaustive list of six issues was presented by the Agency to Iran. This list included "Research on Plutonium", "P1 & P2 Centrifuges", "Source of Contamination", "Uranium Metal Document", "Polonium 210" and "Gchine Mine".

The Islamic Republic of Iran in implementation of the work plan has made utmost transparency and has fully cooperated with the Agency and even concluded the work plan much sooner than the scheduled time table. It is worth mentioning that the implementation of the work plan needed 18 months but the Islamic Republic of Iran implemented it within six months.

Consequently, the Agency in its reports of November 2007 and February 2008, has clearly and evidently declared that all six "remaining outstanding issues" are resolved, and that the Islamic Republic of Iran has answered all the questions presented by the IAEA concerning outstanding issues in accordance with the work plan and these answers are "consistent with the Agency's findings" and that the IAEA "considers those questions no longer as outstanding.” It proved that the declarations of Iran in October 2003 on the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear program were true and the allegations and accusations were completely unsubstantiated.

 

Despite the initial agreement, based on which Iran was supposed to address the past remaining issues, the Islamic Republic of Iran, on the basis of its goodwill and in line with further cooperation with the Agency, considered also the present issues. Two important legal documents, i.e. “Safeguards Approach Document” and “Facility Attachment” for Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) in Natanz was negotiated and finally entered into force on 30 September 2007. Accordingly, as Director General reported in November 2007, the implementation of these documents has provided necessary assurances for the verification of enrichment activities in Iran for the present time and in future.

Thus, all the so-called justifications and flawed foundations raised by few States for the UN Security Council's engagement in the issue of Iran’s program are vanished; therefore, the resolutions adopted by the Security Council lack any legal and technical justifications and originated solely from political and malicious objectives of certain countries. These countries including the United States, France and United Kingdom claim in the Security Council to have concern about proliferation, but indeed either they themselves are modernizing their nuclear arsenals - like the UK Trident Project, or the US mini-nuclear weapons which means vertical proliferation - or are unequivocally supporting others’ nuclear weapons programs, like sightless support of France towards Israeli nuclear arsenals.

 

Additional voluntary measures

 

Furthermore, as it was just reported by the Director General, Iran has provided additional information similar to that which Iran had previously provided pursuant to the Additional Protocol, as well as updated design information and as a result, the Agency’s knowledge about Iran’s current declared nuclear program has become clearer. However, as long as the Security Council’s involvement is continued, this information can only be provided on an ad hoc basis and not in a consistent and complete manner.

In the course of the Director General’s visit to my country, we also provided certain information, in particular with regard to R&D work on enrichment and laser activities.

So-called alleged studies

Now I would like elaborate a few points on the so-called “alleged studies”: 1. According to the work plan the “alleged studies” was not categorized as an outstanding issue since its nature was totally different. It was agreed in the work plan that “as a sign of good will and cooperation with the Agency, upon receiving all related documents, Iran will review and inform the Agency of its assessment” and nothing more.

 

 

 

2. We should not lose sight of the fact that the Agency was not able to deliver the documents since the owner country did not permit the Agency to do so. The reason is clear, the said country wants to keep the control of such fabricated documents and manipulate and prolong the process.

3. Pursuant to request by the Secretariat, Iran has shown its utmost flexibility and reviewed the material merely shown and provided its final assessment. Although it was not envisaged in the work plan to conduct discussions, Iran did so even with provision of written clarifications and responses along with confidential supporting documents and final assessment. Regrettably, after the provision of its final assessment by Iran and the return of Agency’s team to Vienna, Iran was informed that the Agency just received new additional material and has got the permission to show but not deliver them to Iran. The request could not be fulfilled since the deliberation of “the alleged studies” in accordance to the work plan was already concluded.

4. “Alleged studies” are just a bunch of worthless allegations and print-outs of an unknown lab-top which has no authenticity and possessor of them is unidentified and said to be dead.

5. As the Director General reported and repeated in his introductory statement, “it should be noted that the Agency has not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies, nor does it have credible information in this regard.” By this, the Director General, having in mind the past experience, has cleverly disassociated the Agency with such allegations.

Unfortunately, the events in the technical informal briefing and the politically motivated propaganda which seemingly prepared in advance of that meeting, due to the rapid dissemination of its news in the media by ambassadors of certain countries, was directed to tarnish the positive atmosphere created by the cooperation between Iran and the Agency and the resolution of six remaining issues.

Baseless allegations, an endless process

The history of making unfounded allegations by the United States against Iran is not something unprecedented. I enumerated some of them above and the distinguished Members of the Board recall other cases such as the Parchin military site which the Director General later reported to be baseless.

One unregistered case which I should put on the record of the Board today was the allegations about undeclared exploration of uranium mine next to the Gchin mine and construction of uranium conversion facility apparently supported by two satellite images dated 2002 and 2004 of the area and a two-year sophisticated intelligent work by the spies. Unfortunately, after wasting the time and resources of the IAEA and Iran in a fruitless few days search by the inspectors and hosting team using the satellite pictures and GPS equipment arriving at the exact location, found nothing except a stone-cutting workshop, a private company which had built since 2002 a few extra lavatories (alleged facilities) for their newly employed workers! It was very embarrassing for the IAEA inspectors.

Now the question is, who is responsible for the money and resources of the host country and the Agency wasted on such a baseless allegation as well as the damage on the credibility of the IAEA? Be sure that the day would come when we request the compensations for all these damages inflicted on Iran and its peoples through these unsubstantiated allegations and unlawful actions elsewhere. All of those allegations made against Iran are proved to be wrong and baseless and this new allegation is similar to the previous ones which doomed to be untrue.

In this context, distinguished members of the Agency recall the infamous case of “Niger Documents” as one of the basis for waging the war against our neighboring country under the so-called WMD proliferation concerns. Even you may recall that the US officials at the highest level in their formal statements referred to Niger documents to mislead and deceive the public opinion and to justify the invasion of Iraq while they were well aware that those documents were forged. So it would be no wonder that if the documents on the so-called alleged studies to be proved fake and forged.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to state the following:

* Iran has implemented the agreed work plan in full by proactive cooperation even beyond its legal obligations,

* The resolution of all remaining outstanding issues which the DG described as “obviously encouraging” is a turning point in our relations with the Agency where from now on the Safeguards shall be implemented in a routine manner. In this context, the sincere attempts of the Director General is appreciated,

* The unwarranted actions such as the recent one outside of the Agency would not have any impact on Iran’s determination to continue its exclusively peaceful nuclear activities including enrichment and simultaneously continuing its cooperation with the Agency,

* Those unlawful actions would only undermine the authority, credibility and integrity of the Agency,

* Any politically motivated attempt aiming at jeopardizing the existing positive atmosphere in Vienna would face strong opposition by almost all Member States as we have witnessed during this week. In this context, I am obliged to express my sincere appreciations to those who tried hard, particularly the Non-Aligned Movement and its Chairperson to keep the momentum and the constructive environment that was resulted from Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA.

I thank you Mr. Chairman.

 

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Iran Safeguards Report Sent to UN

 

Security Council, IAEA Board

 

Staff Report 26 May 2008

 

IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei is scheduled to address the IAEA Board of Governors at mid-year meetings beginning 2 June 2008 in Vienna. (Photo: D. Calma/IAEA)

IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei today simultaneously circulated a report to the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors regarding Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic ofIran.

The report is being circulated at the request of the UN Security Council, which on 3 March 2008 asked for "a further report within 90 days from the Director General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and [resolution 1803 (2008)], to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the Security Council for its consideration."

Its contents cover developments made since Dr. ElBaradei´s report of 22 February 2008.

The IAEA Board of Governors will discuss the report when it next convenes in Vienna on 2 June. The report´s circulation is restricted and cannot be released to the public unless the IAEA Board decides otherwise.

 

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IAEA: Iran may be withholding
 

info in nuke probe

 

By George Jahn, Associated Press Writer

May 26, 2008


Iran may be withholding information needed to establish whether it tried to make
nuclear arms, the International Atomic Energy Agency said Monday in an unusually strongly worded report.

The tone of the language suggesting Tehran continues to stonewall the U.N. nuclear monitor revealed a glimpse of the frustration felt by agency investigators stymied in their attempts to gain full answers to suspicious aspects of Iran's past nuclear activities.

A senior U.N. official familiar with the investigation into Iran's nuclear program said none of the dozens of agency reports issued in that context had ever been as plain spoken in calling Tehran to task for not being forthright. He agreed to discuss the report only if granted anonymity because he was not authorized to comment to the media.

Iran has described its cooperation with the agency's probe as positive, suggesting it was providing information requested by agency officials.

Ali Ashgar Soltanieh, Iran's chief delegate to the IAEA, said as much again Monday, telling The Associated Press that the report described "the peaceful nature of our nuclear actions."

"The Americans failed ... in shameful attempts" to co-opt the agency into delivering anti-Iranian findings, he said.

He noted a paragraph in the report saying that agency experts had been given access to all declared nuclear material in Iran and verified that all of it was accounted for.

But Gregory L. Schulte, his U.S. counterpart, suggested the report was a strong indictment of Iran's defiance of the international community's efforts to get answers about troubling parts of its nuclear program, noting it "details a long list of questions that Iran has failed to answer."

 


 

"At the same time that Iran is stonewalling its inspectors, it's moving forward in developing its enrichment capability in violation of Security Council resolutions," Schulte told the AP.

He described parts of the report as a "direct rebuttal" of Iranian claims that all nuclear questions had been answered.

U.S. intelligence says Iran stopped work on nuclear weapons in 2003 but some other nations believe such activities continued past that date. The report noted Iran continued to deny such allegations.

Obtained by the AP, the restricted report forwarded to the U.N. Security Council and to the 35 board members of the IAEA said Iran remains defiant of the council's demands that it suspend uranium enrichment.

Shrugging off three sets of council sanctions, Iran has expanded its operational centrifuges — machines that churn out enriched uranium — by about 500 since the last IAEA report, in February, the new report said.

In announcing major progress in his government's push for nuclear power, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said last month that Iranian scientists were putting 6,000 new uranium enriching centrifuges into place and testing a new type that worked five times faster.

The IAEA report noted Iran now had only 3,500 centrifuges and said the few advanced machines actually running were only in a testing phase. Still the senior U.N. official said Iran's goal of 6,000 machines running by the summer was "pretty much plausible."

Uranium can be used as nuclear reactor fuel or as the core for atomic warheads, depending on the degree of enrichment.

Running smoothly, 3,000 centrifuges could produce enough nuclear material for a bomb within 18 months. But Iran insists it is only working to produce fuel for reactors that will generate electricity and says it has a right to conduct enrichment for such purposes under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

In addressing whether Iran was complying with IAEA requests, the report appeared to come down on the side of the U.S. "Iran has not provided the Agency with all the information, access to documents and access to individuals necessary to support Iran's statements" that its activities are purely peaceful in intent, it said.

"The Agency is of the view that Iran may have additional information, in particular on high explosives testing and missile related activities which ... Iran should share with the agency," the report said. It was referring to two alleged sets of tests that IAEA officials say could be linked to a nuclear weapons program.

The allegations of nuclear military programs "remain a matter of serious concern," the report said. Suggesting fears of clandestine weapons activities remain, it added: "Clarification of these is critical to an assessment of the nature of Iran's past and present nuclear program."

Iran already rejected evidence provided by the U.S and other IAEA board members on alleged weapons programs in February, but then promised to revisit the issue before the agency's next board meeting in a week.

Intelligence received by the IAEA in its investigations, as well as from the U.S. and other agency board member nations, suggest Iran experimented with an undeclared uranium enrichment program that was linked to a missile project and drew up blueprints on refitting missiles to allow them to carry nuclear warheads.

The intelligence also suggested Iran was researching construction of an underground site that apparently could be used to test fire nuclear bombs and ordered "dual use" equipment from abroad that could be part of an atomic weapons program.

Additionally, Iran possesses diagrams showing how to mold uranium metal into the shape of warheads.

Its nuclear work has been under IAEA investigation since 2003, when a dissident Iranian group revealed the existence of a clandestine enrichment program.

 

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IAEA: Iran defies demands
on nuclear drive:

by Simon Morgan
AFP
May 26, 2008

Iran continues to defy UN demands to suspend uranium enrichment and has yet to disprove allegations that it was pursuing nuclear power for military use, the UN atomic watchdog said on Monday.

In a confidential new report on Tehran's controversial atomic drive, a copy of which was obtained by AFP, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) complained that Iran had made little real progress on one of the most important issues still outstanding, the so-called "alleged studies".

The studies allegedly carried out by Iran suggest it may have been trying to develop a nuclear warhead and also involve a process of uranium conversion, high explosives testing and a missile re-entry vehicle.

Iran has repeatedly dismissed reports that it conducted such studies as "baseless" and says the intelligence they are based on was "forged".

The IAEA insists, however, that Iran must actively disprove the allegations if it wants to convince the international community that its nuclear drive is purely peaceful.

"Substantive explanations are required from Iran to support its statements on the alleged studies and on other information with a possible military dimension," the report insisted.

"The alleged studies... remain a matter of serious concern. Clarification of these is critical to an assessment of the nature of Iran's past and present nuclear programme.

The IAEA "is of the view that Iran may have additional information, in particular on high explosives testing and missile-related activities, which could shed more light on the nature of these alleged studies and which Iran should share with the agency," the report said.

At the same time, the IAEA found that Iran is still refusing to suspend uranium enrichment, the process that can be used to make the fissile material for an atomic bomb, despite three rounds of UN sanctions.

"Contrary to the decisions of the (UN) Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities," the IAEA complained.

In all, Iran was operating about 3,500 uranium-enriching centrifuges at its main nuclear site in Natanz, the report said.

Tehran has told the IAEA it hopes to have some 6,000 centrifuges up and running by the end of the summer, a target which agency experts have no reason to doubt, a senior official close to the Vienna-based watchdog said.

US and European officials said the report showed that Iran was continuing to stonewall the agency's long-running investigation into the true nature of its atomic drive.

"The report shows in great detail how much Iran needs to explain, and how little it has," said the US ambassador to the IAEA, Gregory Schulte.

"It's disappointing, although perhaps not surprising, given Iran's long history of evasiveness over the real purpose of its nuclear programme," said an EU diplomat.

Iranian ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh insisted that Iran had answered all outstanding questions and said it would continue enrichment for peaceful purposes.

"We have given all the explanations needed as far as we are concerned," Soltanieh told AFP by telephone, calling the IAEA report "a vindication and reiteration of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities."

He added: "We will continue enrichment, while not suspending our cooperation with the IAEA."

The report is to be discussed by the IAEA's board of governors at its meeting on June 2-6.

 

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Atomic Monitor Signals Concern
Over Iran’s Work

By Elaine Sciolino
New York Times

May 27, 2008

 

PARIS — The International Atomic Energy Agency, in an unusually blunt and detailed report, said Monday that Iran’s suspected research into the development of nuclear weapons remained “a matter of serious concern” and that Iran continued to owe the agency “substantial explanations.”

The nine-page report accused the Iranians of a willful lack of cooperation, particularly in answering allegations that its nuclear program may be intended more for military use than for energy generation.

Part of the agency’s case hinges on 18 documents listed in the report and presented to Iran that, according to Western intelligence agencies, indicate the Iranians have ventured into explosives, uranium processing and a missile warhead design — activities that could be associated with constructing nuclear weapons.

“There are certain parts of their nuclear program where the military seems to have played a role,” said one senior official close to the agency, who spoke on the condition of anonymity under normal diplomatic constraints. He added, “We want to understand why.”

The atomic energy agency’s report highlights the amount of work still to be done before definitive conclusions about the nature of the program can be made, a task that the official associated with the agency said would require months.

Iran’s nuclear program has long been a flashpoint, with critics fearing that suggestions that Iran is developing weapons could embolden factions within the administration who have been pushing for a confrontation with Iran.

Iran has dismissed the documents as “forged” or “fabricated,” claimed that its experiments and projects had nothing to do with a nuclear weapons program and refused to provide documentation and access to its scientists to support its claims.

The report also makes the allegation that Iran is learning to make more powerful centrifuges that are operating faster and more efficiently, the product of robust research and development that have not been fully disclosed to the agency.

That means that the country may be producing enriched uranium — which can be used to make electricity or to produce bombs — faster than expected at the same time as it a replaces its older generation of less reliable centrifuges. Some of the centrifuge components have been produced by Iran’s military, said the report, prepared by Mohamed ElBaradei, the director general of the agency, which is the United Nations nuclear monitor.

The report makes no effort to disguise the agency’s frustration with Iran’s lack of openness. It describes, for example, Iran’s installation of new centrifuges, known as the IR-2 and IR-3 (for Iranian second and third generations) and other modifications at its site at Natanz, as “significant, and as such should have been communicated to the agency.”

The agency also said that during a visit in April, it was denied access to sites where centrifuge components were being manufactured and where research of uranium enrichment was being conducted.

The report does not say how much enriched uranium the Iranians are now producing, but the official connected to the agency said that since December, it was slightly less than 150 kilograms, or 330 pounds, about double the amount they were producing during the same period about 18 months ago.

“The Iranians are certainly being confronted with some pretty strong evidence of a nuclear weapons program, and they are being petulant and defensive,” said David Albright, a former weapons inspector who now runs the Institute for Science and International Security. “The report lays out what the agency knows, and it is very damning. I’ve never seen it laid out quite like this.”

Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s ambassador to the atomic energy agency, however, said that the report vindicated Iran’s nuclear activities. It “is another document that shows Iran’s entire nuclear activities are peaceful,” the semi-official Fars News Agency quoted him as saying.

A National Intelligence Estimate published in December by American intelligence agencies concluded that Iran suspended its work on a weapons design in late 2003, apparently in response to mounting international pressure. That report added that it was uncertain whether the weapons work had resumed. It concluded that work continued on Iran’s missiles and uranium enrichment, the two other steps that would be necessary for Iran either to build and launch a weapon or to announce that it is able to construct one quickly.

The Bush administration, in its waning days, seems powerless to modify Iran’s behavior. The question seems to have been pushed to the future with the forceful disagreements in recent days between the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, Senator John McCain, and Senator Barack Obama, contending for the Democratic nomination, over whether an American president should negotiate with Iran’s leadership.

 

Still, Javier Solana, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, announced in Brussels on Monday that he would go to Iran soon — possibly “within the month”   to present a new offer of political, technological, security and trade rewards for Iran if it halts its uranium enrichment program.

Mr. Solana will travel with senior foreign ministry officials from five of the six countries involved in the initiative — Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany   but not the United States, which has refused to hold talks with Iran. The incentives, agreed on by the six countries in London this month but still not made public, repackaged and clarified an incentives package presented to Iran in 2006.

Iran rejected it at the time, saying that relinquishing its uranium enrichment program was non-negotiable. After the London meeting this month, the Iranian foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, said the new package should not cross Iran’s “red line” — shorthand for its uranium-enrichment program.

On May 13, Iran responded with its own package of proposals, calling for new international talks on political, economic and security issues, including its nuclear program and the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The proposal, made in a letter from Mr. Mottaki to the United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, includes the creation of international fuel production facilities in Iran and other countries — a longstanding goal of Iran — as well as improved supervision of Iran’s nuclear program by the atomic energy agency, which is based in Vienna.

Over the years, the United States and France have led the way in opposing the idea of a fuel-production facility in Iran, contending that it would allow Iranian experts to master the complex process of enriching uranium and to use that knowledge in a secret bomb-making project.

Iran insists its uranium enrichment program is devoted solely to producing fuel for nuclear reactors that generate electricity.

The report, which was released on Monday to the agency’s 35-country board of directors and the United Nations Security Council, will be formally discussed by the board next week.

 

 

 

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IAEA Board of Governors

The Board of Governors is composed of 35 Member States, as designated and elected by the General Conference.

·      Related Resources

·      Rules and Procedures of the Board of Governors

·      IAEA Statute

The Board of Governors generally meets five times per year - in March and June, twice in September (before and after the General Conference) and in December.

At its meetings, the Board examines and makes recommendations to the General Conference on the IAEA´s accounts, programme, and budget and considers applications for membership. It also approves safeguards agreements and the publication of the IAEA´s safety standards and has the responsibility for appointing the Director General of the IAEA with the approval of the General Conference.

Board Members for 2007-2008

Member States represented on the IAEA Board for 2007-2008 are Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, India, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and United States of America.

Board Officers


The Chair of the Board of Governors for 2007-2008 is the Ambassador and Resident Representative from
Chile, Mr. Milenko E. Skoknic. He succeeded the Ambassador and Permanent Representative from Slovenia, Mr. Ernest Petrič.


The Ambassadors and Resident Representatives of Croatia and Ireland were also elected as Vice-Chairmen. They are Mr. Mario Horvatic, Governor from
Croatia, and Mr. Frank Cogan, Governor from Ireland.

 

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Soltanieh: Alleged studies
not on IAEA agenda

Tehran Times 052808

 

[As the following article from the Islamic Republic News Agency shows, the old U.S. trick of submitting late questions to the IAEA without timely presentation of supporting data has resulted in the studies allegedly conducted by Iran not being on the IAEA’s agenda.]


VIENNA (IRNA) -- Iran’s IAEA envoy Ali-Asghar Soltanieh said on Tuesday that alleged studies is not among the remaining issues.

“In terms of classification and work plan (modality), the issue of alleged studies is not among remaining issues,” Soltanieh told IRNA one day after release of the IAEA Chief Mohamed ElBaradei’s report on Iran to the IAEA Board of Governors.

Soltanieh said the point had also been explicitly referred to in latest report of the IAEA director general to the previous session of the Board of Governors. The report had emphasized that the remaining issues have been investigated and solved and that the alleged studies is not among the remaining issues, he added.

“The point is that documents related to the subject were not put at Iran’s disposal on time,” he added.

As for the U.S. role in the case, Soltanieh said, “The documents on which the Americans spoke were not offered to the IAEA in the right manner and the director general too has for the first time expressed regret over the failure.”

Based on the report, Americans’ failure to release the documents, and that its offering through an electronic form, has created serious problems for Iran and the Secretariat in the course of the technical talks, noted Soltanieh.

Asked whether there is any end to IAEA chief’s reports and to investigation into Iran’s case on the basis of the alleged studies, Soltanieh said after the Board of Governors meeting in March and one month before the start of specialized talks in Tehran, the IAEA agreed to Iran’s proposal to release full list of the alleged evidences so that no proof can be raised afterwards.

To this end, it had been cited explicitly that documents on Iran will be released only once and for all and that technical talks will be held only within the same limit.

To a question as to when Iran’s case will be treated normally at the IAEA Board sessions, Soltanieh said Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA and the Agency’s inspections of Iran’s facilities follow an ordinary course.

Asked about Iran’s reactions to the U.S. measures and that whether Iran-IAEA cooperation will be disrupted, he said the Islamic Republic of Iran will never allow politics to overshadow technical activities of the IAEA.”

 

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Board of Governors                                 GOV/2008/15

Date: 26 May 2008

Restricted Distribution Original: English

For official use only

Item 7(d) of the provisional agenda (GOV/2008/20)

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards

  

Agreement and relevant provisions of

      

Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006),

   
1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic

4
Republic of Iran

 

Report by the Director General

1.           On 22 February 2008, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2008/4). This report, which covers relevant developments since that date, is submitted to the Board of Governors and to the Security Council, which, in resolution 1803 (2008) of 3 March 2008, requested the Director General to submit a further report on this matter within 90 days.

 

A. Current Enrichment Related Activities

2.           Since the previous report, Iran has continued to operate the original 3000-machine IR-1 unit1 at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). Installation work has continued on four other units as well.2 On 7 May 2008, two 164-machine (IR-1) cascades of one of the four units3 were being fed with UF6, and another cascade of that same unit was in vacuum without  UF6. The installation of the other 15 cascades at that unit is continuing. All nuclear material at FEP, as well as all installed cascades, remain under Agency containment and surveillance. Between the physical inventory taking (PIT) on 12 December 2007 and 6 May 2008, 2300 kg of UF6 was fed into the operating cascades. This brings the total amount of UF6 fed into the cascades since the beginning of operations in February 2007 to 3970 kg.

3.                       On 10 April 2008, Iran informed the Agency about the planned installation of a new generation sub-critical centrifuge (IR-3) at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP). On 19 April 2008, the Agency confirmed that two IR-3 centrifuges had been installed at PFEP. In February 2008, Agency inspectors noted that Iran had also brought 20 IR-1 centrifuges into PFEP, which were run in a 20-machine cascade for a short time, after which they were removed.

4.                       Between 28 January and 16 May 2008, Iran fed a total of approximately 19 kg of UF6 into the 20- machine IR-1 cascade, the single IR-2 centrifuges, the 10-machine IR-2 cascade and the single IR-3 centrifuges at PFEP. All nuclear material at PFEP, as well as the cascade area, remains under Agency containment and surveillance.

5. The results of the environmental samples taken at FEP and PFEP indicate that the plants have been operated as declared.4 The samples showed low enriched uranium (with up to 4.0% U-235), natural uranium and depleted uranium (down to 0.4% U-235) particles. Iran declared enrichment levels in FEP of up to 4.7% U-235. Since March 2007, fourteen unannounced inspections have been conducted.

 

Notes:
1 There are two cascade halls planned at FEP, Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted by Iran, the original 3000-machine unit is referred to as “Unit A24”, one of the eight planned units for Production Hall A.

2 Units A25, A26, A27 and A28.

3 Unit A26.

B. Reprocessing Activities

6. The Agency has continued monitoring the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (the MIX Facility) and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) through inspections and design information verification (DIV). There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. While Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related research and development (R&D) activities in Iran, the Agency can confirm this only with respect to these three facilities as the measures of the Additional Protocol are not available.

C. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects

7.                       On 13 May 2008, the Agency carried out design information verification at the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) and noted that construction of the facility was ongoing. The Agency has continued to monitor the status of the Heavy Water Production Plant using satellite imagery.

8.                       On 10 May 2008, the Agency conducted a DIV at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP). Although the pellet production process for the heavy water reactor fuel is almost complete and some test pellets have been produced, the fuel rod production and fuel assembling processes are still missing some essential equipment.


 

D. Other Implementation Issues

D.1. Uranium Conversion

9. As of 12 May 2008, approximately 11 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 had been produced since 3 February 2008. This brings the total amount of uranium in the form of UF6 produced at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) since March 2004 to 320 tonnes, all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance. Iran has stated that it is not carrying out uranium conversion related R&D activities other than those at Esfahan.

D.2. Design Information

10. On 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision to suspend the implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1 (GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14), but there has been no progress on this issue.

11.                In March and April 2008, Iran provided revised design information for FEP and PFEP, indicating that centrifuges in the new 18-cascade unit (A26) would be installed in FEP and that new types of centrifuges, IR-2 and IR-3, would be installed at PFEP. These changes are significant and as such should have been communicated to the Agency, in accordance with Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, sixty days before the modifications were scheduled to be completed. The Agency was, however, able to ensure that all necessary safeguards measures, including containment and surveillance, were in place before UF6 was fed into the newly installed centrifuges.

D.3. Other Matters

12.                Since February 2008, all fuel assemblies imported from the Russian Federation for use in the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant have remained under Agency seal.

13. On 2 April 2008, the Agency requested Iran to provide, as a transparency measure, access to additional locations related, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, R&D on uranium enrichment, and uranium mining and milling. To date, Iran has not agreed to the Agency’s request.

E. Possible Military Dimensions

14. In addition to the implementation of Iran’s Additional Protocol, for the Agency to provide assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, Iran needs to, inter alia: resolve questions related to the alleged studies (GOV/2008/4, para. 35); provide more information on the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document (GOV/2008/4, para. 19); clarify procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related (GOV/2008/4, paras 40–41); and clarify the production of nuclear equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries (GOV/2004/11 para.37, GOV/2004/34 para.22).

15. During a meeting in Tehran on 21–22 April 2008, Iran agreed to address the alleged studies, the procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies, and questions which had been raised in the Agency’s letters of 8 February and 12 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4 para. 38) (See Annex, Section B. 1). On 9 May 2008, the Agency submitted a request for additional clarifications relevant to the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme (see Annex, Section B.2). Iran provided its response to these questions on 23 May 2008, which is being assessed by the Agency.
 

16.           At follow up meetings in Tehran on 28–30 April and 13–14 May 2008, the Agency presented, for review by Iran, information related to the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project (See Annex, Section A). This included information which Iran had declined to review in February 2008 (GOV/2008/4, paras 35, 37–39 and 42). This information, which was provided to the Agency by several Member States, appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, is detailed in content, and appears to be generally consistent. The Agency received much of this information only in electronic form and was not authorised to provide copies to Iran.

17.                One aspect of the alleged studies refers to the conversion of uranium dioxide to UF4, also known as green salt. A second aspect concerns the development and testing of high voltage detonator firing equipment and exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonators including, inter alia, the simultaneous firing of multiple EBW detonators; an underground testing arrangement (GOV/2008/4, para. 39); and the testing of at least one full scale hemispherical, converging, explosively driven shock system that could be applicable to an implosion-type nuclear device. A third aspect of the studies concerns development work alleged to have been performed to redesign the inner cone of the Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle to accommodate a nuclear warhead.

18.                On 14 May 2008, Iran provided in writing its overall assessment of the documents presented to it by the Agency. Iran stated that the documents “do not show any indication that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been working on [a] nuclear weapon.” Iran also stated that the documents were not authentic, that they were “forged” or “fabricated”. Iran did not dispute that some of the information contained in the documents was factually accurate, but said the events and activities concerned involved civil or conventional military applications. Iran said the documents contained numerous inconsistencies and many were based on publicly available information. Iran stated that “the Islamic Republic of Iran has not had and shall not have any nuclear weapon program.”

19.                Concerning the documents purporting to show that Iran had been working to develop an additional capability to convert uranium dioxide to UF4 (green salt), Iran said it would not have made sense to launch such a project as it had already acquired the necessary technology for UCF.

20.                Concerning the alleged work to design and build an EBW detonator and a suitable detonator firing unit, Iran acknowledged that it had conducted simultaneous testing with two to three EBW detonators with a time precision of about one microsecond. Iran said, however, that this was intended for civil and conventional military applications. Iran further stated, inter alia, that there was no evidence in the documents presented to it to link them to Iran.

21.                Concerning the documents purporting to show administrative interconnections between the alleged green salt project and a project to modify the Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear warhead, Iran stated that, since some of the documents were not shown to it by the Agency, it could not make an assessment of them. Although the Agency had been shown the documents that led it to these conclusions, it was not in possession of the documents and was therefore unfortunately unable to make them available to Iran.

22.                Concerning six technical reports purportedly related to efforts to engineer a new payload chamber for the Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle, Iran stated that the files were in electronic form and could therefore have been easily manipulated. Iran also stated, inter alia, that the documents were not complete and that the report structures varied, which raised serious doubts about their authenticity.

23.                The Agency is continuing to assess the information and explanations provided by Iran. However, at this stage, Iran has not provided the Agency with all the information, access to documents and access to individuals necessary to support Iran’s statements. In light of the discussion on 14 May 2008, the Agency is of the view that Iran may have additional information, in particular on high explosives testing and missile related activities, which could shed more light on the nature of these alleged studies and which Iran should share with the Agency.

24.           It should be noted that the Agency currently has no information – apart from the uranium metal document – on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies. As regards the uranium metal document found in Iran, Pakistan has confirmed, in response to the Agency's request (GOV/2007/58 para.25), that an identical document exists in Pakistan.

25.           Although the Agency did not detect any nuclear activities at Kolahdouz or Parchin (GOV/2003/75 para. 10, GOV/2005/67 para. 41, GOV/2005/87 para. 46, 2006/15 para. 32), the role of military related institutes, such as the Physics Research Center (PHRC), the Institute of Applied Physics (IAP) and the Education Research Institute (ERI) — and their staff — needs to be better understood, also in view of the fact that substantial parts of the centrifuge components were manufactured in the workshops of the Defence Industries Organization (GOV/2004/11 para. 37 and GOV/2004/34, para. 22). The Agency also needs to understand fully the reasons for the involvement of military related institutions in procurement for the nuclear programme.

F. Summary

26.           The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the required nuclear material accountancy reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. However, Iran has not implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information.

27.           The alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project remain a matter of serious concern. Clarification of these is critical to an assessment of the nature of Iran’s past and present nuclear programme. Iran has agreed to address the alleged studies. However, it maintains that all the allegations are baseless and that the data have been fabricated.

28.           The Agency’s overall assessment of the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme also requires, inter alia, an understanding of the role of the uranium metal document, and clarifications by Iran concerning some procurement activities of military related institutions, which remain outstanding. Substantive explanations are required from Iran to support its statements on the alleged studies and on other information with a possible military dimension. Iran’s responses to the Agency’s letter of 9 May 2008 were not received until 23 May 2008 and could not yet be assessed by the Agency. It is essential that Iran provide all requested information, clarifications and access outlined in this report without further delay. It should be emphasised, however, that the Agency has not detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies.

29.           Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP and the installation of both new cascades and of new generation centrifuges for test purposes. Iran has also continued with the construction of the IR–40 reactor.

30.           The Director General urges Iran to implement all measures required to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, including the Additional Protocol, at the earliest possible date.

31.           The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

 

 

A. Documents shown to Iran in connection with the alleged studies

A.1.  Green Salt Project

Document 1: A one page undated flowsheet purportedly originating from the Kimia Maadan Company (KM), which shows a process of bench scale conversion of UO2 to UF4 with a capacity of 1 tonne per year of UF4. The document is entitled “Process Flow Diagram – Green Salt Production – Bench Scale”, bears the words “Kimia Maadan Group” and “Project 5/13”5, and includes a detailed legend of equipment and material balance information.

Document 2: A one page annotated letter of May 2003 in Farsi from an engineering company to KM requesting instructions regarding the supply of a programmable logic control (PLC) system.

A.2.  High Explosives Testing

Document 1: “Analysis and Review of Exploding Bridgewire (EBW) Detonator Test Results” dated January–February 2004, comprising 11 pages in Farsi reporting on work carried out by “Project 3.12” to design and construct an EBW detonator and a suitable detonator firing unit, including testing of about 500 EBW detonators.

Document 2: One page undated document in Farsi providing text and a schematic diagram for an underground testing arrangement. The diagram depicts a 400m deep shaft located 10km from a firing control point and shows the placement of various electronic systems such as a control unit and a high voltage power generator.

Document 3: Five page document in English describing experimentation undertaken with a complex multipoint initiation system to detonate a substantial amount of high explosive in hemispherical geometry and to monitor the development of the detonation wave in that high explosive using a considerable number of diagnostic probes.

A.3. Missile Re-entry Vehicle

Document 1: One page piece of correspondence in Farsi, dated 3 March 2003, from M. Fakhrizadeh to Shahid Hemat Industrial Group (SHIG) management, referring to the “Amad Plan” and seeking assistance with the prompt transfer of data for “Project 111”.

Document 2: One page letter in Farsi, dated 14 March 2004, from a “Project 110” official to Dr Kamran advising him of the views of the project supervisors regarding the report relating to “Group E1” (part of “Project 111”).

Document 3: One page undated document in Farsi providing correspondence from the “Project 111 Office” to “Engineer Fakhrizadeh, Chief, Amad Plan,” referring to a meeting on 28 August 2002 and the provision of the “Project 111” progress report to a Ministry official.

Document 4: Fourteen page document in Farsi dated February–March 2003 entitled “Documentation Preliminary Training” which outlines, in both text and in copies of a presentation, the methodology to be adopted for the production and management of technical reports and documents.

Document 5: Three page document comprising a cover letter in Farsi, dated 11 June 2002, from M. Fakhrizadeh to “Project Executive” requesting that monthly reports are to be provided to him by the 25th of each month in a specified format.

Document 6: Undated, five page document in Farsi from “Orchid Office” to “Design Management” summarizing the scientific activities of the “Project 111 Groups E1 – E6” and the “Vice Chair E.”

Document 7: Comprised of four presentations in Farsi providing an overview of “Project 111” from some time before December 2002 to January 2004. The documents detail various aspects of an unidentified entity’s effort to develop and construct a Shahab-3 re-entry vehicle capable of housing a new payload for the Shahab-3 missile system. The material includes a short film clip on the assembly of a dummy re-entry vehicle payload chamber.

Document 8: “Instructions for Assembling the Chamber Parts, Assembling the Payload Inside the Chamber, and Assembling the Chamber to Shahab-3 Warhead”, 18 pages in Farsi, dated December 2003–January 2004, produced by Group E6 of Project 111.

Document 9: “Explosive Control System. Construction and Design Report”, 48 pages in Farsi, dated December 2003–January 2004, produced by Project 111.

Document 10: “Assembly and Operating Guidelines for Explosive Control System”, 17 pages in Farsi, dated December 2003–January 2004, produced by the Groups E2 and E3 of Project 111.

Document 11: “Design and Construction of Explosive Control System”, 29 pages in Farsi, dated December 2003–January 2004, produced by Groups E2 and E3 of Project 111.

Document 12: “Finite Element Simulation and Transient Dynamic Analysis of the Warhead Structure”, 39 pages in Farsi, dated February–March 2003, produced by Group E5 of Project 111.

Document 13: “Implementation of Mass Properties Requirements of Shahab-3 Missile Warhead with New Payload, with the Use of Nonlinear Optimization Method”, 36 pages in Farsi, dated March–April 2003, produced by Group E4 of Project 111.

 

B. Other Questions

B.1. Questions addressed in Agency letters of 8 and 12 February 2008

1.                  The Agency asked about the possible involvement of an Institute of Applied Physics (IAP) staff member in Iran’s work on EBW detonators; procurement attempts by this person for borehole HP (Ge) gamma spectrometers (GOV/2008/4, para. 40); and Iran’s procurement attempts for spark gaps by another entity (GOV/2008/4, para. 40). Iran stated that the person concerned was not involved in work related to EBWs and that the procurement requests were related to well logging for the oil ministry. Iran denied that attempts were made to procure spark gaps by another entity. The Agency continues to assess the information provided by Iran.

2.                  Iran was also asked by the Agency to clarify the so-called “Project 4”, which could be related to possible uranium enrichment (GOV/2008/4, para. 41). Iran repeated its earlier statements that there had never been a Project 4 and that there had not been any uranium enrichment project in Iran except that carried out by the AEOI. The Agency continues to assess the information provided by Iran.


 

3.                  The Agency asked about the following projects: “Project 5/11/1”, Southern Plant, Bandar Abbas; “Project 5/11/2”, Conversion of yellowcake to UF6; and “Project 5/11/5”, R&D on Mining and Extraction. Iran denied the existence of these projects. The Agency continues to assess the information provided by Iran.

4.                  The Agency requested Iran to describe the purpose of visits abroad between 1998 and 2001 by Mr. Fakhrizadeh and other people known to be involved in Iran’s nuclear programme, and to specify the persons, companies and institutes with which meetings were held. Iran acknowledged that these visits took place, but declared that none of them were related to nuclear activities, including uranium enrichment, and provided no details. On 14 May 2008, the Agency re-iterated its request for a more detailed response.

5.                  In response to the Agency’s requests, Iran denied that procurement attempts were made for neutron sources in 2003. Iran also denied that it had attempted in 1997 to obtain training courses on neutron calculations, enrichment/isotope separation, shock wave software, neutron sources and ballistic missiles (GOV/2008/4, para. 40). The Agency had also enquired about the reasons for inclusion in the curriculum vitae of an IAP employee of a Taylor-Sedov equation for the evolving radius of a nuclear explosion ball with photos of the 1945 Trinity test. Iran indicated that the IAP scientist had been working on dimensional analysis and had included in his resume references available in open sources. The Agency was not permitted to meet with the individuals relevant to these issues and continues to assess the information provided by Iran.

B.2. Questions addressed in Agency letter of 9 May 2008

6.                  The Agency asked Iran for additional clarifications regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. The questions concerned, inter alia:

(a)           information about a high level meeting in 1984 on reviving Iran’s pre-revolution nuclear programme;

(b)           information about a letter published by the Chairman of the Expediency Council in September 2006 which makes reference to possible acquisition of nuclear weapons;

(c)            attempts by a former head of the Physics Research Centre (PHRC) and by the SHIG to procure certain nuclear use and dual use items on behalf of the Technical University and the AEOI (GOV/2008/4/ para. 18);

(d)           the scope of a visit by AEOI officials to a nuclear installation in Pakistan in 1987;

(e)           information on meetings between Iranian officials and members of the supply network in 1993 in Dubai;

(f)              the role of the Central Islamic Revolutionary Committee in procurement transactions with the supply network in 1989;

(g)           whether the following projects have existed or still exist, their purpose, present status and the entities involved: “Project 4/8”, “Project 3.14”, “Project 8”, “Project 13 (Project 44)”, “Group 14”, “Project 10”, “Project 19” and “Project 159”;

(h)           supporting documents about the order of aluminum bars and sheets that were presented to the Agency on 27 January 2006 (GOV/2006/15, para. 37);

(i) the nature, intended purpose and application of the radiation monitoring equipment which a staff member of IAP attempted to acquire in 1998;


 

(j)           information about the purpose of work done by the Pishgam company around 2000 related to the design of a PUREX based process for the AEOI; and

(k)        an agreement which, according to open source information, was signed on 21 January 1990 by Iran's Minister of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics to build a 27 MW reactor in Esfah

 

 

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NY Times again misrepresents

IAEA report on Iran

Cyrus Safdari

Iran Affairs, May 27, 2008

 

I finally got the May 2008 IAEA report on Iran and just as I guessed, the media have totally mischaracterized it, as usual.

As usual, the New York Times is the worst. According to the Times, the IAEA has accused Iran of a “willful lack of cooperation”  -- but the report contains no such accusation whatsoever. That's the Times' own editorial commentary, inserted as if it was news and falsely attributed to the IAEA. This is the second time that the NY Times has put words in the IAEA's mouth - previously the NY TImes falsely claimed that the IAEA had determined Iran's disclosures were "inadequate" and that Iran had missed a critical deadline -- neither assertion was true, as I have discussed before.

There are similar omissions and outright lies in this report.

For example, as evidence of what the NYTimes claims is the IAEA's supposed "frustration with Iran's lack of openess",  the article points out that IAEA has said that Iran's installation of new centrifuges were “significant, and as such should have been communicated to the agency.” The NY Times implies that Iran was caught doing something secret by the IAEA. 

Aha, but that's not what the IAEA report says.  In paragraph 11 of the report, the IAEA states that the Iran should have informed the IAEA of the centrifuge installation IF the "Subsidiary Arrangements" (which sets a 60-day notice period) was in force -- and paragraph 10 speccifically says that this subsidiary arrangement is not in force with respect to Iran. So, Iran did  inform the IAEA of the installation of the centrifuges, but just not within the full 60-day notice period specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. (Iran had at one time voluntarily implemented these subsidiary arrangements when it had temporarily suspended enrichment under the terms of the Paris Agreement, but stopped doing so when it quite legally restarted its enrichment program after the EU-3 tried to cheat on the Paris Agreement by demanding that Iran turn its temporary suspension of enrichment into a permanent halt.)

 Furthermore, the NY Times totally fails to mention the last sentence in paragraph 11 which states that the IAEA was nevertheless able to monitor the newly-installed centrifuges, and all the necessary safeguards were in place before the centrifuges were put into use.

Next, according to the NY Times, Iran is using "more powerful centrifuges" too, and so "That means that the country may be producing enriched uranium — which can be used to make electricity or to produce bombs — faster than expected." 

Of course, the NY Times fails to mention that  according to paragraph 5 of the same IAEA report, the centrifuges are all operating under IAEA safeguards, "continue to be operated as declared", and have been the subject of 14 surprise visits -- and so there's nothing particularly "unexpected" about Iran's activities, nor can the centrifuges be used to make bombs since they"re under 24-hour monitoring by the IAEA.

The NY Times claims that the IAEA "was denied access to sites where centrifuge components were being manufactured and where research of uranium enrichment was being conducted." -- totally leaving out that according to paragraph 13 the same IAEA report, these were "transparency measures" which is the IAEA's way of referring to requests for inspections over and above what Iran is obligated to provide to the IAEA. Iran had a policy of allowing such transparency measures in the past but on an "ad hoc" basis, and is under no obligation to allow them at all since they exceed what the IAEA Safeguards Agreement require of Iran.

The NY Times says that according to ElBaradei himself, some components of Iran's nuclear program were "produced by Iran's military" suggesting that it means that Iran was making nukes for military use. Ooooh Sppooookyyy! But actually, in paragraph 14, the IAEA report says that some components of Iran's nuclear program may have been produced by "companies belonging to defence industries" which is hardly the same thing. After all, General Electric, a major US defense contractor, owns NBC studios too. Does that mean that NBC is owned by the US "military"? There's nothing particularly incriminating about a military company role, even if it is true. The defense industries in many countries are active in civilian industries -- the Chinese military makes washing machines, and Brazil's navy is a major driving source for their nuclear program.

The NY Times claims that Iran has "refused to provide documentation and access to its scientists to support its claims" that documents about "alleged studies" into nuclear weaponization were forgeries, and then the NY Times selectively quotes the report's conclusion that the outstanding matters "remain a matter of serious concern" in order to imply that Iran has failed to address these issues.

Actually, nowhere in the IAEA report does it say that Iran "refused" to provide documentation regarding the alleged studies. Quite the opposite, the IAEA report states that the Iranians have agreed to respond to the allegations and have provided detailed answers "which are being assessed by the Agency." (paragraph 15)  

Furthermore, the IAEA report list instances in which the Iranians did respond to the allegation as part of Iran's "overall assessment of documents presented to it." (paragraph 18) For example, the Iranians have pointed out that they had no need to develop a secret "green salt" project when they were already successfuly converting uranium (paragraph 19) There are other similar instances in the report.

But this is where things get really funny - and so it is too bad that the NY Times decided to leave it all out:

According to the report, the IAEA was in several cases not able to actually provide these same "alleged studies" documents to Iran, because the IAEA didn't even have the documents itself or was not "permitted" to share them with Iran. So, rather than Iran "failing" to provide documentation, it was the IAEA which failed to provide documentation. Iran was nevertheless expected to disprove allegations supposedly contained in documents that the IAEA itself didn't have or was not allowed to show to Iran.

For example, in paragraph 21, the IAEA report states: "Although the Agency had been shown the documents that led it to these conclusions, it was not in possession of the documents and was therefore unfortunately unable to make them available to Iran." Also, in paragraph 16, the IAEA report states: "The Agency received much of this information only in electronic form and was not authorised to provide copies to Iran."

Other significant facts about the IAEA report that the NY Times sees fit not to print: that the IAEA doesn't have any nuclear weapons information (paragarph 24), Iran has continued to provide access to the IAEA inspectors and allowed inspections required by its safeguards agreement, and the IAEA has still found no diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful uses (which legally means Iran is still in full compliance with the NPT) (paragraph 26) and that all of Iran's enrichment activities, reprocessing activities, uranium conversion and heavy water reactor construction programs continue to be operated under IAEA safeguards, exactly as they're supposed to be conducted.

So, there you have it - the reality of what the IAEA report says, versus what the NY Times misrepresented.


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