September 15, 2008,
Report on Iran
Below is the September 15, 2008 IAEA Director General's report on Iran.
Immediately following the report itself is an analysis of the IAEA Director General's report by Cyrus Safdari of Iran Affairs.
Atoms for Peace
Board of Governors
Date: 15 September 2008
Restricted Distribution Original: English
For official use only
Item 9(d) of the provisional agenda (GOV/2008/33)
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007)
and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Report by the Director General
1. On 26 May 2008, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) (GOV/2008/15). This report covers relevant developments since that date.
A. Current Enrichment Related Activities
2. Since the Director General’s previous report, Iran has continued to operate the original 3000-machine IR- 1 unit1 at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). In addition, installation work has continued on four other units. On 30 August 2008, five 164-machine (IR-1) cascades of Unit A26 were being fed with UF6 and another cascade of that same unit was in vacuum without UF6; installation of the remaining 12 cascades at that unit is continuing (GOV/2008/1 5, para. 2). All nuclear material at FEP, as well as all installed cascades, remain under Agency containment and surveillance. As of 30 August 2008, 5930 kg of UF6 had been fed into the operating cascades since 12 December 2007, the date of the last physical inventory verification (PIV) carried out by the Agency at FEP. This brings the total amount of UF6 fed into the cascades since the beginning of operations in February 2007 to 7600 kg. Based on Iran’s daily operating records, as of 30 August 2008, Iran had produced approximately 480 kg of low enriched UF6.
3. At the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), between 16 May and 25 August 2008, Iran fed a total of approximately 30 kg of UF6 into the 10-machine IR-2 cascade and the single IR- 1, IR-2 and IR-3 centrifuges. Another 139 centrifuges in a 162-machine IR-1 cascade are in vacuum, but are not being fed with UF6. All nuclear material at PFEP, as well as the cascade area, remains under Agency containment and surveillance.
4. The results of the environmental samples taken at FEP and PFEP to date2, and the operating records for FEP3 since the Director General’s last report, indicate that the plants have been operating as declared (i.e. less than 5.0% U-235 enrichment). Since March 2007, seventeen unannounced inspections have been conducted at FEP.
B. Reprocessing Activities
5. The Agency has continued to monitor the use and construction of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility and the Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40) through inspections and design information verification (DIV). There have been no indications of ongoing reprocessing related activities at those facilities. While Iran has stated that there have been no reprocessing related research and development (R&D) activities in Iran, the Agency can confirm this only with respect to these three facilities as the measures of the Additional Protocol are not available.
6. On 14 August 2008, Iran provided updated Design Information Questionnaires (DIQ) for the MIX Facility and the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL), both located at the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre. The updated DIQ for the MIX Facility provided information on Iran’s plans to fabricate low enriched uranium targets at JHL for the production of molybdenum for medical purposes through irradiation of the targets at TRR and their separation at the MIX Facility.
C. Heavy Water Reactor Related Projects
7. On 13 August 2008, the Agency conducted a PIV at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP), the results of which are still pending. No major changes in the construction status of FMP have been noted since the Agency’s previous visit in May 2008 (GOV/2008/15, para. 8).
8. On 27 August 2008, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 and noted that construction of the facility was ongoing. Using satellite imagery, the Agency has continued to monitor the status of the Heavy Water Production Plant, which appears to be in operational condition.
D. Other Implementation Issues
D.1. Uranium Conversion
9. As of 3 August 2008, approximately 28 tonnes of uranium in the form of UF6 had been produced at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) since 8 March 2008, the date of the last PIV carried out by the Agency at UCF. This brings the total amount of uranium in the form of UF6 produced at UCF since March 2004 to 342 tonnes, all of which remains under Agency containment and surveillance. In the revised DIQ for JHL, referred to above in paragraph 6, Iran also indicated that conversion related R&D activities would be carried out at JHL (cf. GOV/2008/1 5, para. 9).
D.2. Design Information
10. As previously reported to the Board of Governors (GOV/2007/22, paras 12–14), on 30 March 2007, the Agency requested Iran to reconsider its decision to suspend the implementation of the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1. There has been no progress on this issue.
11. The Agency requested in December 2007, but has not yet received, preliminary design information for the nuclear power plant that is to be built in Darkhovin.
D.3. Other Matters
12. On 2 April 2008, the Agency requested Iran to provide, as a transparency measure, access to additional locations related, inter alia, to the manufacturing of centrifuges, R&D on uranium enrichment, and uranium mining and milling (GOV/2008/1 5, para. 13). Iran has not yet agreed to the Agency’s request.
13. On 3 September 2008, the Agency conducted an inspection at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. All of the fuel assemblies imported from the Russian Federation for use at the plant have remained under Agency seal.
E. Possible Military Dimensions
14. There remain a number of outstanding issues, identified in the Director General’s last report to the Board (GOV/2008/1 5, para. 14), which give rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. As indicated in the Director General’s report, for the Agency to be able to address these concerns and provide assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, it is essential that Iran, inter alia, provide the information and access necessary to: resolve questions related to the alleged studies; provide more information on the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document; clarify procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related; and clarify the production of nuclear equipment and components by companies belonging to defence industries.
15. As also indicated in GOV/2008/1 5 (paras 16–25), in a series of meetings in April and May 2008, the Agency held discussions with Iran on these matters, and sought additional clarifications relevant to the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran provided written replies on 14 and 23 May 2008, the former of which included a 117-page presentation responding to the allegations concerning the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project. While Iran confirmed the veracity of some of the information referred to in the Annex to GOV/2008/1 5, Iran reiterated its assertion that the allegations were based on “forged” documents and “fabricated” data, focusing on deficiencies in form and format, and reiterated that, although it had been shown electronic versions of the documentation, Iran had not received copies of the documentation to enable it to prove that they were forged and fabricated. Iran also expressed concern that the resolution of some of these issues would require Agency access to sensitive information related to its conventional military and missile related activities.4
16. After further assessment of Iran’s responses, the Agency, in a series of meetings held in Tehran on 7–8 and 18–20 August 2008, highlighted areas where additional information was necessary. While expressing regret that the Agency was not in a position to provide Iran with copies of the documentation concerning the alleged studies, the Agency emphasized that the documentation was sufficiently comprehensive and detailed5 that it needed to be taken seriously, particularly in light of the fact that, as acknowledged by Iran, some of the information contained in it was factually accurate. The Agency also recalled the earlier discussions with Iran, as a result of which the Agency had concluded that Iran might have additional information, in particular on high explosives testing and missile related activities, which could shed more light on the nature of the alleged studies. The Agency encouraged Iran, as a matter of transparency, to address the substance of the allegations with a view to dispelling the doubts which naturally arise, in light of all of the outstanding issues, about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. The Agency also expressed its willingness to discuss modalities that could enable Iran to demonstrate credibly that the activities referred to in the documentation are not nuclear related, as Iran asserts, while protecting sensitive information related to its conventional military activities.
17. To that end, over the course of the meetings, the Agency made a number of concrete proposals for addressing the alleged studies. The following are examples of those proposals.
a. In connection with the alleged studies in general, the Agency requested that Iran identify and clarify those elements of the documentation which it considered to be factually correct, and to specify those aspects considered by Iran to have been fabricated.
b. In connection with the alleged green salt project, the Agency requested access to the originals of the letters and contracts involving Kimia Maadan, which Iran has acknowledged exist, and copies of some of which Iran has provided to the Agency, with a view to resolving some inconsistencies identified by the Agency in the supporting document provided by Iran. The Agency has also requested access to individuals named in the documentation.
c. In connection with the alleged studies in high explosives testing, the Agency has asked Iran to provide additional information and documentation, and access to individuals, in support of its statements about the civil and conventional military applications of its work in the area of EBW detonators (GOV/2008/1 5, para. 20).
d. With reference to the document describing experimentation in connection with symmetrical initiation of a hemispherical high explosive charge suitable for an implosion type nuclear device, Iran has stated that there have been no such activities in Iran. Since the Director General’s previous report, the Agency has obtained information indicating that the experimentation described in this document may have involved the assistance of foreign expertise. Iran has been informed of the details of this information and has been asked to clarify this matter.
e. Some important parameters reflected in the documentation relating to the re-design of the payload chamber for the Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle are the same as those reflected in the documentation referred to in paragraphs (c) and (d) above (e.g. dimensions). The Agency proposed discussions with Iranian experts on the contents of the engineering reports examining in detail modelling studies related to the effects of various physical parameters on the re-entry body from time of launch of the missile to payload detonation. The discussions would be aimed at ascertaining whether these studies were associated with nuclear related activities or, as Iran has asserted, related only to conventional military activities. In addition, the Agency requested access to three civilian workshops identified in the documentation.
18. The Agency believes that Iran could, as a matter of transparency, assist the Agency in its assessment of the alleged studies by providing it with access to documents, information and personnel to demonstrate, as Iran asserts, that these activities were not nuclear related. Unfortunately, Iran has not yet provided the requested information, or access to the requested documentation, locations or individuals.
19. As indicated in the Director General’s report to the Board in February 2008 (GOV/2008/4, para. 19), Iran has said that it is unable to provide any additional clarification of the circumstances related to the acquisition of the uranium metal document, reiterating that the document in question had been received along with the P-1 documentation, and that it had not been requested by Iran.
20. The Agency is still awaiting responses to a number of procurement related questions which may shed light, inter alia, on the role of the military related entities and their staff in the procurement of items for Iran’s nuclear programme and related technical activities in support of that programme. With regard to the production of nuclear related components by companies related to defence industries, Iran’s response of 23 May 2008 did not provide any new information. Iran has thus far declined to address these issues as, in its opinion, such issues should be addressed as a routine safeguards matter, and only after the issue of the alleged studies has been resolved.
21. As indicated in the Director General’s previous report, the Agency currently has no information — apart from the uranium metal document — on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies (GOV/2008/1 5, para. 24). Nor has the Agency detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies. However, unless Iran undertakes as a measure of transparency, in accordance with its obligations under Security Council resolution 1803 (2008)6 and other related resolutions, to resolve substantively the outstanding issues, the Agency will not be in a position to progress in its verification of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran. Only through the expeditious resolution of these outstanding issues can doubts arising therefrom about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme be dispelled, particularly in light of the many years of clandestine nuclear activities by Iran.
22. The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the required nuclear material accounting reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities. However, Iran has not implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements General Part, Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information.
23. The Agency, regrettably, has not been able to make any substantive progress on the alleged studies and other associated key remaining issues which remain of serious concern. For the Agency to make progress, an important first step, in connection with the alleged studies, is for Iran to clarify the extent to which information contained in the relevant documentation is factually correct and where, in its view, such information may have been modified or relates to alternative, non-nuclear purposes. Iran needs to provide the Agency with substantive information to support its statements and provide access to relevant documentation and individuals in this regard. Unless Iran provides such transparency, and implements the Additional Protocol, the Agency will not be able to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
24. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP, and the installation of new cascades and the operation of new generation centrifuges for test purposes. Iran has also continued with the construction of the IR–40.
25. The Director General urges Iran to implement all measures required to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme at the earliest possible date.
26. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
1 There are two cascade halls planned at FEP: Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted by Iran, the original 3000-machine unit is referred to as “Unit A24”, one of the eight planned units for Production Hall A. The four other units of Hall A at which installation work is currently proceeding are Units A25, A26, A27 and A28.
2 Results are available for samples taken up to 5 April 2008 for FEP and up to 20 April 2008 for PFEP. These results have shown particles of low enriched uranium (with up to 4.0% U-235), natural uranium and depleted uranium (down to 0.4% U-235 enrichment).
3 Which show enrichment levels at FEP of up to 4.9% U-235.
4 Iran reiterated these concerns in a letter to the Director General dated 5 September 2008.
5 As indicated in the Director General’s report (GOV/2008/15, para. 16), the documentation presented to Iran appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, is detailed in content and appears to be generally consistent.
6 Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council, in resolution 1803 (2008), inter alia, reaffirmed Iran’s obligation to, “without further delay, take the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolution GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions”. As indicated in the Board’s resolution, these steps include transparency measures, as requested by the Director General, which extend beyond the formal requirements of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and additional Protocol.
of September 15, 2008,
report on Iran's nuclear program
September 15, 2008
So the September 15, 23008, IAEA report on Iran is out. Here's what it says.
First of all, the London Telegraph article by the infamous fiction-writer Con Coughlin who cited anonymous experts in claiming that Iran had "removed significant quantities of UF6", is flatly disproved by the IAEA report. Paragraph 9 of this report plainly states that all of the UF6 "remains under Agency containment and surveillance."
Secondly, media reports claiming that Iran had "blocked" or "stalled" the IAEA are similarly false. Nothing in the report says anything of that sort. These are value-laden descriptors which don't represent the true state of affairs, where Iran has stated that the "alleged studies" pushed from the so-called "Laptop of Death" were false, provided a 117 page written response to the allegations, was not allowed to actually see the documents making the claims -- and the IAEA had suggested ways to resoolve that dispute - and that is all. The report does NOT say Iran rejected the proposed modalities to resolve the issue or "blocked" anything.
The most important paragraph in the report is Paragaph 22 which states:
The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the required nuclear material accounting reports in connection with declared nuclear material and activities.
You may wonder why this paragraph, way at the end of the report, is the most important one. The answer is this: it means that Iran continues to be in compliance with its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty for reasons explained in this post.
Paragraphs 2 through 4 state that Iran's enrichment facilities are operating under IAEA safeguards, exactly as they're supposed to be, producing low-enriched uranium (which cannot be used to make bombs, contrary to all the news reports that insist on calculating how many bombs Iran can make with these machines) and were even the subject of 17 surprise inspections. The previous report had said that the same facilities were subject to 14 surprise inspections too. (I should point out that there is a legal limit to the number of inspections that are allowed, since the inspections are not supposed to unduly interfere with the operations of the facilities - I wonder how close to the limit we are now.)
Paragraphs 5 and 6 are about reprocessing of nuclear fuel. Iran has said that there is no reprocessing going on at the listed facilities, and the IAEA has affirmed that.
Here, the report also adds that the IAEA can't verify there are no undeclared facilities and so the IAEA can't verify the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. This is repeated in Paragraph 23. This language has often been seized upon by the Iran bashers to cast suspicion on Iran by innuendo. So let me reiterate the facts: the IAEA does not verify the absence of undeclared nuclear activities for any country unless they have signed and ratified the Additional Protocol (which permits more stringent inspections of nuclear facilities.) According to the IAEA itself, there are currently something like 40 other countries for which the IAEA similarly cannot verify the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. Some other countries - like Egypt (recently held up by Rice as a model nuclear program) have refused to even sign the Additional Protocol, unlike Iran. That doesn't mean that the IAEA suspects there are any undeclared facilities.
As Michael Spies of the Lawyer's Committee for Nuclear Policy has explained:
For some it is tempting to declare, based on the inability of the IAEA to presently draw a conclusion on the absence of nuclear activities, that Iran continues to operate concealed facilities and that any such facilities must be for a military program. But the IAEA has cautioned that the lack of a conclusion does not imply suspicion of undeclared nuclear materials and activities, as the matter is frequently spun in the media and by some governments.
Second point: Iran did in fact voluntarily implement the Additional Protocol by allowing the more stringent inspections for the course of 2 years during the course of the Paris Agreement negotiations with the EU3 - even though it was not legally obligated to do so - and still no evidence of nuclear weapons or undeclared activities was found in Iran (in fact the IAEA complained publicly that the intelligence that the US had given the IAEA of supposedly "secret" Iranian nuclear sites had proven to be bogus.) And, Iran has offered to ratify the Additional Protocol, once its nuclear rights are recognized.
Paragraphs 7 and 8 say that Iran's construction of their planned heavy water nuclear reactor and related facilities continue to be monitored by the IAEA, exactly as they're supposed to be.
Paragraph 9 just describes Iran's uranium conversion efforts. Cconversion is the step before enrichment: raw uranium is turned into yellow cake, then into a gas called UF6 or uranium hexafluoride, before being enriched in centrifuges as nuclear fuel. This paragraph and says that all of the converted uranium remains under IAEA safeguards. There's no mention of any "missing" UF6 as claimed by the Con Coughlin in the Telegraph (actually, the Coughlin article makes a number of confused and contradictory claims, i.e., it repeatedly confuses UF6 with "enriched uranium.")
Paragraph 10 and 11 are about "preliminary design information" -- the information that Iran agreed as a voluntary, non-binding measure to provide to the IAEA about nuclear facilities it plans to build in the future, but had not yet built. Iran had agreed to provide this info during the course of the Paris agreement, as it had agreed to allow inspections beyond its legal obligations -- but pulled back when the EU tried to cheat Iran by raising their demands and insisting that Iran turn a temporary suspension of enrichment into a permanent ban on enrichment. Here, the IAEA has requested that Iran go back to providing that preliminary information. Tough luck! Why should Iran do more than the NPT requires when it is getting less than what it is entitled to receive?
Paragraph 12 is where the phrase "as a transparency measure" is first mentioned in this report. "Transparency" actually means "inspections beyond Iran's legal obligations" - beyond Iran's safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and even beyond the Additional Protocol requirements that are not applicable to Iran anyway. As footnote 6 in the report states, the UN Security Council has demanded that Iran give in to these transparency measures -- but the demand is ultra vires and illegal, since among other things the Security Council does not have the legal authority to force a country to abide by an agreement it has not signed (such as the Additional Protocol).
You see, under Iran's existing standard safeguards agreement, Iran is only required to allow IAEA inspections of sites which contain (or are meant to contain) nuclear material -- such as the uranium enrichment plants where Iran's centrifuges turn uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas into low-enriched uranium fuel. Iran does NOT have to allow inspections of other sorts of weapons facilities, such as rocket design sites, or even facilities where other forms of nuclear-related technologies are developed but which do not involve nuclear material. (That is why this very same IAEA report states clearly in Paragraph 21 that it has no evidence that nuclear material was used in these "alleged studies")
According to this paragraph, the IAEA has requested that Iran provide access to non-nuclear facilities, such as the facilities where the centrifuges themselves are manufactured. This is outside of the scope of Iran's legal obligations. And as I have mentioned before, this is precisely the sort of targeting intelligence that the US and Israel would need to attack Iran (since blowing up Iran's enrichment facilities is useless if Iran can then just build more centrifuges and continue the program.)
Coincidence? You decide.
I should point out that Iran had allowed such "transparency" inspections in the past even though it was not obligated to do so -- the inspection of the Parchin military base for example, long the subject of lurid and baseless speculation, but which turned up exactly nothing -- and had continued to allow such innspections on an "ad hoc" basis according previous IAEA reports -- but does not allow such "transparency" inspections on a regular basis for a number of reasons. Iran probably doesn’t want to set a precedent of being treated as a 2nd class member of the NPT, subject to additional, extra-legal inspections when similar demands are not made on other NPT signatories. And, Iran would not want to give away intelligence which could be used in targeting since Israel and the US regularly threaten to bomb Iran in blatant violation of international law.
Paragraph 13 simply says that the Bushehr reactor is under safeguards as usual. Iran and Russia have announced that the reactor will become operational in a few months. The interesting point I should mention is this: the IAEA made it clear years ago that the Bushehr reactor is not considered to be a nuclear threat. The Bush administration even conceded that point. However, as I have mentioned, the latest video by the "United Against Nuclear Iran" NeoCon lobbying group has gone back to claiming that Bushehr is some sort of threat. Gotta wonder why... Since Bushehr is not a weapons threat but only produces energy, and as a lightwater reactor cannot be used to secretly make bombs, then obviously these people basically have a problem with Iran having civilian nuclear power rather than just weapons.
Paragraphs 14-21 are about the allegations of the so-called "Laptop of Death" that the US intelligence supposedly obtained from someone who smuggled it out of Iran. These are the paragraphs that the media reports are selectively concentrating on -- totally ignoring the previous paragraphs which state that Iran's nuclear program continues to function under full IAEA safeguards.
Basically, they say that the IAEA wants Iran to address the Laptop of Death allegations in greater detail, even though they have not presented Iran with the actual documents that contain the allegations as required by the August 2007 modalities agreement -- and the IAEA has made some specific proposals for Iran to be able to do so. NOWHERE in these paragraphs does it say that Iran has "blocked" anything. Iran may very well decide to accept the IAEA's proposals -- which the IAEA report itself says are &"transparency measures" which means they are outside of what Iran is legally required to do.
Also, note specifically that Paragraph 21 states that the IAEA itself has found
no evidence on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies ... Nor has the Agency detected the actual use of nuclear material in connection with the alleged studies.
As a preliminary matter, let’s get some facts straight: In August 2007, Iran and the IAEA reached a "modalities agreement" about how Iran would clear up all the outstanding issues regarding its nuclear program with the IAEA. As part of this agreement, Iran said it considered the "alleged studies" claims to be fabrications, but as a good faith measure, would address the claims upon receiving the documentation about the "alleged studies" too. BUT IRAN HAS STILL NOT RECEIVED THE DOCUMENTATION BECAUSE THE US REFUSES TO LET EVEN THE IAEA SEE THE FULL DOCUMENTATION.
Three months later, in its November 2007 report, the IAEA said that Iran had in fact cleared up 9 of the outstanding issues -- with no evidence of a nuclear weapons program having been discovered. In February 2008, despite pressure and false allegations by some Western countries, the IAEA Director ElBaradei declared that all the remaining issues had been cleared up too:
We have managed to clarify all the remaining outstanding issues, including the most important issue, which is the scope and nature of Iran´s enrichment programme" with the exception of a single issue, "and that is the alleged weaponization studies that supposedly Iran has conducted in the past.
Needless to say, this was a remarkable conclusion by the IAEA since it effectively gave Iran a clean bill of health about its so-called hidden past nuclear activities.
So my point is this: while the current IAEA report talks a lot about the "alleged studies" lets not forget the source of these studies, the logical fallacy of requiring Iran to disprove a negative (see Nukie the Nuclear Spaghetti Monster) and let’s not forget that, after years of the most intensive inspections in the IAEA's history, Iran had come up clean -- no actual evidence of a nuclear weapons program. And that's precisely why the US finally, belatedly and only partially presented the "Laptop of Death" evidence to the IAEA in 2008 (after years of shopping it around as evidence of Iran's perfidy without letting the IAEA actually see it.)
Other than this highly questionable Laptop of Death, no evidence of any nuclear program has ever been found to exist in Iran, as certified by the IAEA itself. (The Russians have been saying that they've never seen any "objective evidence" of a nuclear program either.)
(I'm going to rush things along a bit here are this post is getting too long)
The most important paragraph in the Summary section is Paragraph 23 which I briefly touched upon when addressing Paragraphs 5 and 6 above, and which requests that Iran provide more detailed information on how the alleged studies claims are false, and the IAEA says that the allegations are serious -- but it does NOT say that that Iran has blocked or refused to address them. So we'll have to see how the ongoing negotiations with Iran play out.